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ABSTRACT 
Wenjie Zhang 
THE POST-SOVIET RUSSIAN MEDIA REFORM 
(Under the direction of Robert Stevenson) 
 
 
 
This thesis explores the post-Soviet Russian media reform from Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s glasnost in 1986 to Vladimir Putin’s control of the media in 2005. It 
traces the trajectory of the Russian media reform after the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, follows several typical trends in various periods of transition, analyzes the 
main actors in the transition and their different strategies, and finally tries to answer 
the question: why was the Russian media reform a failure? 
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SELECTED GLOSSARY 
Global Media Culture: In this paper, the global media culture mainly refers to the 
Western news value, presentation style and also a set of universal commercial media 
standards. 
 
Nationalization: According to The Columbia Encyclopedia (Sixth Edition, 2006), the 
term of “Nationalization” refers to acquisition and operation by a country of business 
enterprises formerly owned and operated by private individuals or corporations. In 
non-Communist countries it has been common practice to compensate the owners of 
nationalized properties, at least in part; however, in the Communist countries, where 
private ownership is opposed in principle, there usually has not been such 
compensation. In this paper, the “nationalization” is known as public ownership or the 
act of taking private assets into government or state ownership. Media nationalization 
insists on the unparalleled leading role of government in media reform. 
 
Privatization: According to The Columbia Encyclopedia (Sixth Edition, 2006), 
privatization is the reverse process of nationalization. In this paper, privatization is the 
process of moving from a government-controlled system to a privately run, for-profit 
system. 
 
Professionalism: The Western theories of professionalism provides a model for 
groups (like doctors, lawyers, accountants, social workers and other self-defined or 
publicly recognized “professions”) who control unique bodies of knowledge not 
shared by the rest of society (Curry 1990). Professionals are defined as being part of 
occupational groups that have gone through a proves involving the establishment of 
professional organizations and schooling, developing full-time work commitments, 
and pressing for the right to control their own work and membership (Johnson, 1972). 
Journalism profession is defined as one of these groups, which are able to claim a 
significant amount autonomy and self-control. In this paper, the professionalism 
mainly refers to the professionalism of journalism in Russia. 
 
Professionalization: The ability of any profession to reach the point where it can 
build and maintain a large amount of autonomy within a bureaucracy is a result of 
both the process of individual professionalization and the process of 
professionalization for the group itself (Curry 1990). In this paper, the media 
professionalization emphasizes on the self-independence and media freedom. 
Professionalization makes the media more independent and improves standards in 
collecting, editing, reporting and disseminating objective and balanced information. 
 
Shock therapy: In economics, shock therapy refers to the sudden release of price and 
currency controls, withdrawal of state subsidies, and immediate trade liberalization 
within a country. During the early 1990s economist Jeffrey Sachs recommended to the 
newly emerging economies of the former Soviet Union that they too release all price 
 v
controls, subsidies, sell off state assets and float their currencies in order to shake off 
the economic lethargy of the communist era. The shocks took the form of sudden 
radical changes to the structure and incentives within economies. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
The collapse of the Soviet Union was hailed by the West as a victory for 
freedom, a triumph of democracy over totalitarianism, and evidence of the superiority 
of capitalism over socialism. Despite the enthusiasm and euphoria that accompanied 
the anticommunist earthquake in the early 1990s, the anticipated societal changes 
proved to be many formidable tasks in Russia. Media reform was the most essential 
and complicated one among them. At the same time when it was so deeply 
transformed by the sweeping process of change in Russian society, media also help to 
shape society in a very profound way. It was media that contributed much to the 
disintegration of the USSR. It was media that brought the idea of marketization into 
the ailing Russian economy. It was media that aroused the Russian people to seek 
independence and freedom. However, as an important part of the democratic process, 
the liberalization of media in Russia remains far from complete. From the early 1990s 
when Russia embarked on revamping media legislation—a process that brought more 
control and restrictions on media—until the present when Vladimir Putin commands 
and directs the whole country, Russian media have been enduring a severe winter. It 
can be said that media reform has failed.  
For Russian media professionals, since the demise of the Soviet Union life has 
not been easy and they have had to struggle to survive between the scissor-blades of 
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two opposing forces. One blade is the threat coming from the gigantic financial 
moguls. Another blade is the threat coming from various political figures. Given this 
circumstance, it is difficult for the media professionals to preserve a high level of 
professionalism and independence. Compared with media professionals in other 
democratic countries such as the United States, they are relatively weak and 
uninfluential. Professional solidarity is also very low among Russian journalists. 
There is little sympathy for the journalists themselves among the public at large. 
Russian media professionals were trapped in an awkward predicament of prosperity 
without freedom.  
This thesis is written following a timeline from Gorbachev’s glasnost to 2005. 
Chapter II provides the historical background of the post-Soviet Russian media 
transition. The traditional communist media theory prevented the Russian media from 
being independent. The media situation of the entire country at that time was dismal 
and suffocating. Journalists and editors were only trained as the mouthpiece of the 
Communist Party. Fortunately, healed by the Gorbachev’s glasnost, during the last 
few years of the Soviet empire media started to gain more freedom and independence. 
The following chapter mainly focuses on the first tenure of President Boris 
Yeltsin from 1991 to 1996. The theme during this period was media privatization. 
Media privatization strongly supported the independence of the Russian media. As a 
milestone of media independence, the Russian media professionalism also reached a 
new level, which culminated with the campaign against the first Chechnya war. 
During that period being a journalist was on the frontline for the struggle for 
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democratization and change. Nevertheless, the Russian media were also confronted by 
two challenges. One was the pressure from a dismal economic situation; the other was 
the pressure from the rising power of Yeltsin who frequently intervened into media 
affairs.  
Media professionals in the beginning of the nineties saw their social place in 
terms of the “Fourth Estate” concept that placed them on an equal level with other 
branches of power—the executive, legislative and judicial. However, the 1996 
presidential campaign marked a turning point. It started the collusion between the 
media tycoons and the Kremlin.  
In chapter IV, the prosperity of Russian media empires is analyzed. The 
government’s flattering attitude towards the financial groups offered shrewd 
businessmen an opportunity to put their feet in the door of media. The earliest and 
most influential media groups were Gusinsky’s “Media Most” and Berezovsky’s 
“LogoVAZ Holding Company.” With Russian media empires thriving, the oligarchs 
and the Kremlin began to collude with each other. In fact, by the end of 1997 it was 
difficult to find a Moscow-based newspaper that did not have direct or indirect link 
with financial factors or political power.  
The period from 1998 to 1999 is marked by the split of oligarchs and the 
government. Russia’s deepening economic crisis in 1998 not only caused the split, but 
also made it difficult to maintain a diverse, free and independent media. During the 
process of the split, the media gradually shift from privately-controlled to 
state-controlled. From other viewpoints, the split among the financial elites, to a 
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substantial degree, reflected the long-standing rift in the central government. The 
Russian cabinet was divided into different camps then: Yeltsin; the “young reformers”, 
represented by First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais and Boris Nemtsov; 
Victor Chernomyrdin and Yuri Luzhkov. However, beyond all expectation, Yeltsin 
won this contest finally by choosing an iron-handed heir, Vladimir Putin, the former 
KGB (the former Soviet State Security Committee) officer. His appearance not only 
crushed the hope of the oligarchs, but also reshuffled the Russian media, leading to 
the dismal current state of Russia in media.  
Chapter V concentrates on the Putin era. In Putin’s Russia, authoritariasm 
became the keynote of the Russian media once again. Soon after Putin became the 
president of the Russian Federation, Russian media were again tamed without any 
independence and freedom. His ascendancy to power greatly increased the influence 
of state-owned media and enhanced the state’s power over private media. Moreover, 
his policies against the oligarchs could also be described as a deliberate attempt to 
reduce pluralism in media and to strengthen the dominance of state. Besides, the 
pattern of violent attacks on journalists continued. The Committee to Protect 
Journalists (CPJ) ranked Russia as one of the 10 most dangerous places to be a 
journalist.1  
The conclusion part offers an explanation of why Russian media transition 
was a failure of democracy and speculate on the future of Russian media.  
                                                 
1 Robert Coalson BBC News Online business reporter, “We have definitely Moved backwards: An 
Overview of Media in Russia” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Online, June 18, 2004 
<http://www.rferl.org/reports/mm/2004/06/11-180604.asp> 
 
 4
The post-Soviet Russian media transition is a much broader topic. It is hard to 
cover the all aspects of this great and complicated course that has lasted for more than 
20 years. Therefore, this thesis only traces the trajectory of the Russian media reform 
after the disintegration of the USSR, follows several trends in various periods of 
transition to analyze, follows the main actors in the game and their different strategies, 
and finally tries to answer the question: why was the Russian media reform a failure? 
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CHAPTER II 
COMMUNIST MEDIA THEORY AND THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE 
MEDIA TO THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION 
This chapter provides the historical background of the post-Soviet Russian 
media transition. There are two parts in this chapter. The first section summarizes 
communist media theory and briefly describes the role of mass media in the Soviet era 
by comparing print and broadcast media. The second section mainly focuses on the 
contribution of the media to the demise of the Soviet Union during the period from 
1985 to 1991, which was marked by glasnost and the rise of independent journalism.  
2.1 The Panorama of Soviet Mass Media 
On November 9, 1917, the Soviet government’s second day in office, Vladimir 
Ilyich Ulyanov (Lenin) signed one of the most important laws, the Decree on the 
Press, which set the basic tone of the communist press. The core of the decree was to 
ban all the bourgeois newspapers that resisted and potentially threatened the new 
authorities. The text of the decree described measures for shutting down all the 
anti-revolutionary newspapers permanently and immediately. The impact of the 
decree was so great that it soon became the cornerstone of Soviet policies towards the 
press in the following 70 years.  
The usual role of media includes forming and reflecting public opinion, 
communicating the world to individuals, and reproducing modern society’s self-image. 
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Nevertheless, the Soviet media went far beyond this definition. The media in West 
European and North American countries functioned as a “Fourth Estate,” the guardian 
of the public interest and a powerful watchdog on the activities of government, 
revealing abuses of state authority and defending the democratic rights of citizens. 
However, compared with their counterparts, the Soviet media acted as servants 
subordinated to the government and party, the engine of ideological production and 
the propaganda tools to educate the public to support the policies of these two 
bodies.2 From this viewpoint the Soviet media did form public opinion, albeit by 
monopolizing information, by transmitting information to the whole society and by 
indoctrinating the public into the doctrine of communism and socialism. However, 
also limited by these functions, the Soviet media could not fully fulfill its function as 
“Fourth Estate.”  
If the Soviet media could be described as the puppet Pinocchio, then the party 
pulled the strings behind the curtain. Agitprop, the Central Committee’s Department 
of Agitation and Propaganda, and Glavlit, the main watchdog within the party’s 
Agitprop Department, firmly and strictly controlled the mass media. They had 
absolute authority to subject all publications to prior censorship. Any publication at 
any level was to be checked and approved by a Glavlit representative before final 
printing. Under these circumstances, the role of the editors ceased to be influential. 
Even though an editor might have felt uncomfortable about the content of a story, he 
                                                 
2 John Murray, The Russian Press from Brezhnev to Yeltsin: Behind the Paper Curtain (England: Edward 
Elgr Publishing Company, 1994) 39 
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or she could not change Glavlit’s decision. Therefore, it can be said that the Soviet 
editors and journalists were not professional editors and journalists in the Western 
sense. They were trained as propagandists in universities, and in practice they 
consequently became the mouthpiece of the party. The major skills they learned were 
to formulate messages to influence the audiences in certain ways—to persuade, to 
elicit a particular response, and sometimes to deceive.3 There were two methods of 
media control. One was the censorship control; the other was nomenklatura control of 
personal. The close relationships between the party and media were just maintained 
by the nomenklatura system. “Nomenklatura” is a Russian word invented in the 
Soviet era to refer specifically to a small group of elite among the huge population of 
party members who enjoyed privileges as a ruling class. The nomenklatura system 
allowed the party to control the selection of candidates for administrative positions 
through stringent procedures. Accordingly, the press, as one of the organs of 
government, did not have rights to select editors. In each newspaper there were some 
important administrative positions, such as the editorial staff and the chief-editor that 
were filled by party appointments. For example, all editors of Izvestiya (Informations), 
the second most authoritative paper, and the two directors of two national news 
agencies, TASS and Novosti (News), were appointed this way. That was one major 
approach of government to control the news coverage.  
2.1.1 The Print Media: Newspapers 
                                                 
3 Joseph Gibbs, Gorbachev’s Glasnost: The Soviet Media in the First Phase of Perestroika (College 
Station : Texas A & M University Press, 1999) 4 
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Newspapers were traditionally the preferred medium of the Communist Party 
to promote the Soviet ideology. From the first day of the USSR, Lenin and his 
successors clearly knew how to make full use of newspapers as one of the most 
powerful instruments to protect and consolidate their authority. In 1990 there were 
more than 8,500 newspapers with combined circulations of 200 million copies and 5, 
200 magazines with annual printings of 3,700 million copies published in the Soviet 
Union, with an average of 400 copies per 1,000 of people.4  
The content of the newspapers was dominated by communist slogans, 
ideological doctrines, and a large amount of official party news that was written in a 
strict, unattractive, and staid style. Censored by those loyal party members who 
always kept an eye on the newspaper articles, Soviet newspapers first had to be 
politically right. In the meantime, working within the frame of government, Soviet 
newspapers were also characterized by a firm hierarchical structure. All the 
newspapers were divided into three groups: central, republic and local. The central 
newspapers (See table 2 ), such as Pravda (Truth), an organ of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee, and Izvestia, which emanated from 
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, were the bellwether for all important events, 
and the lower level newspapers had to follow them in reporting news. Before Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s glasnost the thousands of newspapers were not allowed to develop 
independent identities. The entire printing press was one of the ideological products in 
                                                 
4 Data source: Maria Agranovskaya, Yelena Bazhenova, Mikhail Valyayev and Yuri Veslinsky, ed. USSR 
Yearbook 1990 (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1990), 200. 
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the pipeline of the huge communist machine. 
Table 2: Circulation of Leading Central Newspapers in 1985-1989 
(in million copies) 
Newspaper 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Argumenty I 
Fakty 
1.4 1.9 3.2 9.1 20.5 
Trud 16.7 18.2 18.2 19.0 19.8 
Izvestia 6.7 6.9 8.0 10.4 10.1 
Pravda 10.5 10.8 11.1 10.7 9.7 
Komsomolskaya 
Pravda 
13.2 14.6 17.0 17.6 17.6 
Soiurce: USSR Yearbook 1990 (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 
1990) 
2.1.2 Broadcasting: Radio and Television 
From the early days of the Soviet Union, the development of the broadcasting 
system was considered by the Soviet leaders as priority. Before TV came into 
popularity, radio monopolized the broadcasting arena. Like all the other ideological 
tools, radio attempted to instill in the population a sense of duty and loyalty to the 
party and state. In 1990, radio broadcasts covered all of the Soviet territory and 
totaled more than 1,400 hours daily. The All-Union Radio broadcasted an average of 
132 hours a day in eight main channels and in 67 languages of Soviet nationalities. 
Radio broadcasting was completely controlled by the state.5  
On the other hand, television, also completely state-owned, had quickly grown 
during the 1970s. In 1988 approximately 75 million households owned television sets, 
and an estimated 93 percent of the population watched televisions.6 Moscow, the base 
from which most of the television stations broadcasted, transmitted some 90 percent 
                                                 
5 Maria Agranovskaya, USSR Yearbook 1990, 201. 
 
6 Maria Agranovskaya, 202. 
 
 10
of the country’s programs, with the help of more than 350 local stations and nearly 
1,400 relay facilities. Until the end of the 1980s, television broadcasts were conducted 
in 45 different languages for a total of 4,000 hours a day. Central Television broadcast 
in 13 channels an average of 150 hours each day.7 Television began to replace the 
press as the main source of news and information for the Soviet population. However, 
almost every television program tried to include an ideological theme. Televised 
propaganda bombarded viewers in many forms. TV programs, like “Winner in 
Socialist Emulation” and “How to Put Your Heart into Your Work,” encouraged the 
audience to improve the construction of socialism. Patriotic films that portrayed 
Soviet victories during World War II, such as “Ballad of a Soldier” and “Six o’clock 
in the Evening after the War,” were also very popular. The Soviet leaders took great 
advantage of television’s popular appeal to achieve their own political aims. 
Gorbachev was an example. He always used television as a useful channel to reach 
the population with his speeches and public relations campaigns. This trend 
accelerated during the final five years of the 1980s, which was the high point of a 
famous reform: glasnost. Gorbachev’s glasnost loosened the original ideological 
control to television from the party and the government. From another angle, 
television, to a large extent, promoted the glasnost campaign, which began the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union.  
2.2 The Contribution of the Media to the Demise of the USSR 
In retrospect, when the hammer and sickle flag was lowed over Red Square, a 
                                                 
7 Maria Agranovskaya, 202 
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previously mighty empire passed into history and left a question that continues to 
generate debate: What role did media play in the collapse of communism? Two main 
trends interacted with each other in the process. One was the Gorbachev’s glasnost; 
the other was the awakening of self-identification of Soviet media professionals. 
In 1985, Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the CPSU, which 
marked the beginning of perestroika and glasnost and the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
At 54, Gorbachev was considered a young man full of potential and eager to revitalize 
the sluggish Soviet system, especially the economy and society. He presented his 
country with two main reform ideas: perestroika and glasnost. The former referred to 
restructuring the economy and social institutions and the latter referred to the policy 
of openness or transparency. Just as the economic reform—perestroika—aimed to 
transform the stagnant, inefficient command economy of the Soviet Union into a 
so-called decentralized market-oriented economy, glasnost tried to cure the “tumor” 
that existed for a long time in the Soviet media. The main goals of this policy were to 
make the country’s management transparent and open to debate, and to change the 
former situation in which major political and management decisions were made by a 
narrow circle of apparatchiks and were beyond criticism. To a large extent, 
Gorbachev’s policy of using the media to make information available on some 
controversial issues, in order to provoke public discussion, did challenge government 
and party bureaucrats, and mobilize greater support for his policy of perestroika. 
The first signal of the beginning of the glasnost campaign was the 1986 
Chernobyl crisis, which overtook the official announcement of glasnost, scheduled for 
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the mid-1986. On April 26, 1986, a reactor explosion at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power 
Station, located in northern Ukraine, covered Belorussia, the Baltics, parts of Russia, 
and Scandinavia with a cloud of radioactive dust. Unexpectedly, Gorbachev, the 
outstanding proponent of glasnost, chose to be silent for eighteen days before 
addressing the nation about the nuclear disaster. There are many conjectures about the 
reasons of Gorbachev’s silence. Several books written in the early years of glasnost 
provide modest insight into the Chernobyl catastrophe. Among those are Dismantling 
Utopia: How Information Ended the Soviet Union (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1994), by 
Scott Shane, a Moscow correspondent for Baltimore Sun; Uncovering Soviet 
Disasters: Exploring the Limits of Glasnost (Boston: Little Brown, 1988), by James 
Oberg, a space scientist. Zhores Medvedev’s chapter “Chernobyl: A Catalyst for 
Change,” in Milestones in Glasnost and Perestroika, edited by A. Hewett and Victor 
H. Winston, argues that Gorbachev’s relatively weak position in the Politburo at the 
time prevented him for acting forcefully or quickly. Brian McNair also supported this 
point of view in his book Glasnost, Perestroika and the Soviet Media (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1991). Nevertheless, without considering those guesses, if the 
short silence of Gorbachev could be described as the brief darkness before the dawn, 
then the Chernobyl explosion was just the fuse for the explosion of glasnost, which 
Gorbachev for months had been preaching in his nation’s affairs. Before Chernobyl, 
the world still wondered how serious Gorbachev was about glasnost. Undoubtedly, 
the explosion at Chernobyl was a clear turning point. The disaster was too big to deny. 
The causes too clearly pointed to the fundamental failures of the Soviet system of 
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government—the bureaucracy, the incompetence, the technological inferiority. 
Gorbachev seemed to have recognized this and decided that it was time to admit the 
country’s shortcomings—not all of them, but at least the ones it couldn’t deny. 
Therefore, after May 6, 1986 when the Kremlin held a news conference to officially 
reveal the causes and the consequences of the explosion, the initial silence was broken, 
followed by complete honesty and unparalleled information of the likes of which had 
never been seen in the USSR before.  
Then, as its name implies, glasnost gave new freedoms to the people, such as 
the freedom of speech. Criticizing the government and the party was no longer a 
“mission impossible.” Meanwhile, there was also greater speech freedom within the 
media. In the domain of broadcasting, television began reporting more openly the 
socio-economic processes taking place in Soviet society. It moved from an 
informative approach towards problem reports, “round-table” formats, commentary, 
and phone-in programs. The programs in the series “Problems-Questions-Solutions” 
held discussions between ministers and heads of government departments and a 
multimillion audience of viewers. They discussed ways of improving the Soviet 
economy and of solving topical social problems. After such discussions there were 
tens of thousands of letters and thousands of phone calls from viewers all of which 
were left unanswered. 
Another sign of more openness was the rewriting of the party history with 
greater fidelity to the facts. Getting rid of the veil of propagandists and agitators, the 
Soviet media challenged the distortion of history and presented the true face of the 
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Communist Party to the public. Naturally, many ideological issues previously off 
limits could be openly discussed. Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state, the previously 
sacrosanct idol highly adored in Soviet society, was questioned and challenged for the 
first time. In June 1988 a leading Soviet journalist, writing in the monthly magazine 
Novyi Mir8 (New World), pointed out that Lenin personally justified the use of state 
terror in managing the Soviet system. To some degree, the reappraisal of Lenin 
reflected the extent to which Soviet media could tell the truth about the past. And in 
the following years criticizing the previous leaders in newspapers and magazines 
became more and more common. On January 4, 1990 the literary bimonthly 
Literaturnaya Gazeta (Literary Gazette)9 asserted that Stalin ordered Trotsky’s 
murder in 1940. One month later, on February 3 Argumenty i Fakty (Arguments and 
Facts)10 published Roy Medvedev’s estimate of 40 million victims under Stalin, 
including 20 million dead.  
In late 1987, the new head of the Soviet Writers’ Union, Daniil Granin visited 
the United States, to promote Gorbachev’s glasnost. During his visit, he argued that 
“One fine day after Gorbachev came to power, censorship was abolished.” He also 
                                                 
8 Novyi Mir (New World), one of the most controversial and often original literary reviews, attracted 
widespread readership among the intelligentsia. The monthly publication reached nearly 2 million readers and 
concentrated on new prose, poetry, criticism, and commentary. 
 
9 The literary bimonthly Literaturnaya Gazeta (Literary Gazette) disseminated the views of the Union of 
Writers and contained authoritative statements and perspectives concerning literature, plays, cinema, and literary 
issues of popular interest. 
 
10 Argumenty i Fakty(Arguments and facts, commonly abbreviated “AiF”) is a weekly newspaper based 
in Moscow and a publishing house in the Russian Federation and worldwide now. It was founded in 1978 by the 
Russian organization “Knowledge” to provide propagandists with statistical and other hard-to-find information. In 
1980 AiF was transformed into a weekly but was not in wide circulation. It was available only by subscription to a 
closed circle of political people. After 1985, it was one of the leading publications in the glasnost campaign. 
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added, “It is the first time in the history of Russia, not only the Soviet Union11” 
Although Granin exaggerated the real effects of Gorbachev with an intention to 
narrow the gap between Soviet and Western conceptions of news values, the 
relaxation of information censorship under glasnost resulted in the Communist Party’s 
losing its absolute status in Soviet media. For example, to challenge the foundations 
of censorship, Gorbachev first began to undermine the authority of the Union of 
Writers to determine which works were appropriate for publication. Officials from the 
Union were required to place works directly in the open market and to allow these 
works to be judged according to reader preferences, thereby removing the barrier 
between writer and reader and marking the beginning of the end of the party 
censorship. Moreover, many long-banned works were published in popular magazines. 
A literary commission was set up to oversee Boris Pasternak’s publications, which 
effectively gave the green light to his famous novel Doctor Zhivago, banned since 
1957. The leading journals, such as Novyi Mir, Znamia (Knowledge) and Moscow’s 
illustrated bimonthly magazine Ogonyok (Little Fire),12 became the beacon of cultural 
independence.13 In October 1990 Novyi Mir even serialized works by Aleksandr 
Solzhenitsyn.14
                                                 
11 Lucy Komisar, “One Fine Day After Gorbachev Came to Power,” Christian Science Monitor, 29 
December 1987: 3 
 
12 Ogonyok (Little Fire), a weekly that became more popular in the late 1980s because of its insightful 
political exposes, human interest stories, serialized features, and pictorial sections, had an audience of over 2 
million people. 
 
13 Neil Cornwell, “Soviet Literature – Glasnost,” The Literary Encyclopedia. University of Bristol, 25 
Feb. 2021. <http://www.litencyc.com/php/stopics.php?rec=true&UID=1592> 
 
14 On July 3, 1990, Literturnaia Gazeta reports that Union of Soviet Writers had reinstated Aleksandr 
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The declaration of glasnost also led to a fundamental change in the content of 
the media. After the standard control mechanisms of Glavlit and Agitprop were 
eliminated by glasnost, journalists started to enjoy independent authority; the editors 
gradually secured greater discretion over the “sensitive content.” Before the glasnost 
campaign, the functions of the Soviet media were to provide official truths, to channel 
criticism in an appropriate way and to motivate people to participate in 
government-initiated campaigns and development plan. Thus, it determined that 
media should only be allowed to report on the positive news of the social life, the 
achievements of the social construction. Any “bad news,” which reflected the dark 
side of the Communist Party and Soviet society, was cleansed by the censorship 
agency from the public eyes. However, the seemingly peaceful and thriving world 
created by the self-deceiving party leaders was like a sea with a quiet surface carrying 
a powerful emotional undercurrent that inspired soviet people to ponder the frailties of 
communism ideology. For instance, in the 1960s the Soviet planners had ignored the 
fact that Central Asia represented a closed, finely balanced watershed and arbitrarily 
diverted the rivers to turn steppes and deserts into a huge cotton plantation, draining 
away so much water that the rivers were nearly dry on their lower courses. With the 
implementation of the glasnost policy, the debates about this huge ecological disaster, 
which had taken place only in journals or in closed meetings, were exposed to the 
public. In general, problems such as poor housing, alcoholism, drug abuse, pollution, 
                                                                                                                                            
Solzhenitsyn, whom it expelled in 1969. For details, see Alan Pollard, ed., USSR: Facts and Figures Annual, vol. 
14, (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1990) 350. On August 16 1991, President Gorbachev restored 
citizenship of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and 20 other Soviets exiled between 1996 and 1988. For details, see Alan 
Pollard, ed., USSR: Facts and Figures Annual, vol. 15, (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1991) 404.  
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outdated Stalinist-era factories, and petty to large-scale corruption, all of which the 
official media had ignored, received increased attention. At the same time the trust in 
mass media among the population also increased relevantly. Newspaper and magazine 
circulation exploded. The magazine Ogonyok more than doubled its subscribers from 
1.35 million to over 3 million.15
On August 1, 1990, the main body responsible for censoring the press, Glavlit, 
was formally abolished. It was replaced by the short-lived “Main Administration for 
the Protection of State Secrets in the Mass Media (GUOT).” With the Soviet media 
opening up without strict ideological censorship, more and more secret political 
events that had been long denied by the government were also brought into the 
spotlight. Media reports openly attacked the CPSU as a whole, criticized the military, 
and exposed crimes committed by Stalin and the Soviet regime, such as Gulags and 
the Great Purges ignored by the official media. On March 22, 1991, Izvestia reported 
that historian Natalia Lebedeva concluded from documents in the Soviet central and 
military archives that Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (Peoples’ Commissariat 
of Internal Affairs, commonly abbreviated NKVD) murdered up to 15,000 Polish 
officers in Katyn Forest in April-May, 1940. She implicated dozens of Soviet police, 
army and government officials, including Stalin and Beria. Three prison camps were 
emptied of Poles to make room for Baltic deportees.  
These reports not only damaged the credibility of the Soviet government 
                                                 
15 Paul Quinn-Judge, “Outspoken Soviet Publication Pusher for Independence,” Christian Science 
Monitor, 23 December1988: 9. 
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incrementally but also at the same time increased the dissatisfaction among the 
population. The ingrained faith of the public in communism and Soviet society was 
undermined and the Communist Party’s social foundation was also eroded gradually. 
With all these unbelievable truths coming out piece by piece, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union was inevitable.  
In fact, glasnost proved to be a double-edged sword16. At the beginning of 
glasnost, Gorbachev tried to reform the institutions within the frame of Communist 
theory. Nevertheless, the outcome of the reforms was far beyond the anticipation of its 
inventor. Gorbachev probably never forecast that the haphazard use of glasnost finally 
would threaten his own ability to command and direct the whole country. That was 
also why the most Westerners puzzled over whether the Kremlin leader really hoped 
to open the Soviet society to the outside world.17 In fact, Gorbachev himself was 
ambivalent. He was first a leader of the Communist Party, who was educated and 
trained to be loyal to his belief. Thus, when he felt the situation would be out of 
control, he tried to slow down the speed of reforms. On October 14, 1990, Gorbachev 
met with the representatives of Soviet editors. At a meeting where he complained 
about press criticism, Gorbachev singled out Vladislav Starkov, editor of the 
newspaper Aegumenty i Fakty, which had published a popularity poll on members of 
the Supreme Soviet. On the same day CPSU ideology chief Vadim Medvedev ordered 
                                                 
16 Joseph Gibbs, Gorbachev’s Glasnost: the Soviet Media in the First Phase of Perestroika, 90 
 
17 Thomas M. Magstadt, “Gorbachev and Glasnost—a New Soviet Order? Implications for U.S. Foreign 
Policy,” Cato Policy Analysis No. 177 (March 20, 1989) 
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the dismissal of Starkov. Starkov was one of millions of Soviet media professionals. 
Before the reforms they were “Puppet Pinocchios,” who were manipulated by the 
party and government. Nevertheless, Pinocchio was more than a puppet. He was 
trying to leave the realm of puppetry, to escape from its emotional manipulation and 
control, and to become a truly free soul. So were the media professionals in USSR. 
Inspired by Gorbachev’s glasnost, their potential consciousness to be a “Fourth 
Estate,” or a powerful watchdog in liberal democracy, revealing abuses of state 
authority and defending the democratic rights of citizens, was gradually awakened.  
From the time when Gorbachev first introduced the vanguard reforms into 
Soviet society until the date when the Soviet empire disappeared from the planet, it 
was only six years. For different people, six years could be very short or could be very 
long. But for the Soviet people, its meaning cannot be measured by time units. The 
impact was huge; the outcome was incredible. The glasnost, the openness of 
information, played the significant part as the key catalyst in the whole process of the 
USSR’s collapse. It not only accelerated the demise of the rotten system, but also, to a 
large extent, hastened the maturing of the Soviet media professionals. Different from 
the Western counterparts who could fully enjoy democracy and the freedom of speech, 
Soviet media practitioners had to deal with the pressures both from the party and the 
government. However, their potential to be professional media practitioners, their 
potential ability to assume the responsibility of the “Fourth Estate” never faded as 
time passed. Like the winter seeds hibernating underground waiting for the coming 
spring to sprout, the Soviet media practitioners also expected to be freed from the 
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fetters of Soviet doctrines. Glasnost was just their chance of renaissance. 
Overall, the traditional communist media theory prevented the Russian media 
from being independent. And Soviet journalists and editors played a role as the 
propagandist organs of the Communist Party. Fortunately, healed by the Gorbachev’s 
glasnost, during the last few years of the Soviet empire the Soviet mass media began 
to enjoy the independence and freedom. This period lasted until 1992. The following 
chapter will first describe this short period from 1991 to 1992. 
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CHAPTER III 
POST-SOVIET MEDIA 
The key words of the period from 1991 to 1996 were “Opportunities” and 
“Challenges.” For the Russian media, “Opportunities” meant that it was time to 
become independent and it was time to take its position as the “Fourth Estate,” with 
executive, legislative and judicial powers. However, “Challenges” to media came, on 
the one hand, from economic difficulties and, on the other hand, from the increasing 
power of the president. This chapter describes the formation and the development of 
the Russian media, and the major difficulties confronted by the Russian media during 
the first five years of the Russian Federation. It includes two sections. The first 
presents the short golden age of the Russian media from 1991 to 1992. The second 
concentrates on the next four-year period, which emphasizes the growth of the 
sustainable prosperity of the Russian media and the challenges from the economic 
difficulties and political powers at the same time. 
There are also two major cases to be analyzed: one is the first Chechnya war; 
the other is the 1996 presidential election. The former case demonstrates that the 
professionalism of the Russian media professionals attained a high level as its 
Western counterparts did. The latter case indicates the decline of Russian media 
independence.  
3.1  The Short Golden Age of the Russian Media (1991~1992) 
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In the era of the Soviet Union access to information was severely restricted. 
Aiming to manipulate the mass media as the most important ideological weapon, the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) established full-scale political 
guidelines for media and successfully controlled the public this way for 70 years. 
However, in early 1990s, with the regime changing from the original communist 
dictatorship to the so-called capitalist democracy, a revolution in the media industry 
was triggered by the glasnost.  
Firstly, at the federal level press law emphasized the independence of the 
Russian mass media. The Russian media law signed by President Boris Yeltsin on 
December 27, 1991, significantly guaranteed the media freedom and prohibited 
censorship. This law was regarded as one of the greatest achievements in Yeltsin’s 
position. It provided for the registration of newspapers or broadcasting media, 
although with a right of appeal to the courts if registration was refused. It forbade 
censorship or the establishment or financing of any censorship agency. The law also 
forbade the closing down of any media outlet except by order of a court after due 
warning. Simultaneously, because property rights were not clearly mentioned in the 
law, the new Russian media seemed to be completely free from any power.18 The 
sudden and unprecedented freedom gave the Russian media practitioners multiple 
paths to the future, such as imitating the Western media system and cultivating their 
own Russian-portrait media. Ivan Zassoursky pointed out that from the year 1991 to 
                                                 
18 Kaarle Nordenstreng, Elena Vartanova and Yassen Zassoursky, Russian Media Challenge (Helsinki: 
Kikimora Publication, 2001) 74 
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1992, “Russian media landscape started to change and global media culture was 
introduced to Russian audience.”19 During this short period, the theme was the 
privatization of media, accompanied by the trend of learning from Western 
journalism.  
The commonly accepted definition of privatization is the process of moving 
from a government-controlled system to a privately run, for-profit system. 
Privatization of the Russian media clearly reflected some ideas listed above. The 
media organs started to operate as commercial enterprises. The changes in the 
operation mechanism from state-owned to privately-owned determined the changes in 
the contents and style of news reporting. The whole industry of mass media, which 
had been basically an ideological propaganda organ, began to deal more with 
diversified information rather than the dull predictable articles. At the same time the 
global media culture also infiltrated into Russian society following by the media 
privatization. It directly and delicately influenced the Russian media practitioners by 
teaching them about the markets of news and advertising.20
Media privatization first happened in the arena of print. The first independent 
newspaper—Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Independent Newspaper), which was launched in 
1990 by chief-editor Vitaliy Tretyakov and a group of young journalists—fostered the 
first wave of media privatization. It was followed by the establishment of several 
                                                 
19 Ivan Zassoursky, “Russian Media in the Nineties: driving factors of change, actors, strategies and 
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(Berlin: Freie University, 2000) 
 
20 Ivan Zassoursky, Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 2004) 35 
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national daily newspapers—such as Obshchaya Gazeta (Communal Newspaper)21, 
published in 1991—which were forced to close in the Soviet era, and some new 
formats of newspapers like weekly business newspaper Kommersant (Businessman), 
Economicheskaya Gazeta (Economic Newspaper), and tabloids Megapolis-Ekspress 
(Metropolitan Express). Take Nezavisimaya Gazeta as an example. Inspired by the 
French newspaper Le Monde, Nezavisimaya Gazeta was characterized by its emphasis 
on exhaustive reporting, by its presentation of different viewpoints, by its diversified 
editorial board and also by its pure independence not only from those people in power, 
but also from the political opposition.22 Its staff mainly consisted of journalists and 
editors who came from the small-circulation and even underground publications in the 
former USSR era. Therefore, they were more courageous in news coverage than the 
journalists trained by Soviets media theory were. After its first issue appeared on 
December 21, 1990, Nezavisimaya Gazeta immediately became popular in many 
Russian cities. The emergence of Nezavisimaya Gazeta implied two things: first, 
media privatization created a good environment for Russian media practitioners to 
cultivate their responsibility to the public as the “Fourth Estate;” second, the Russian 
media embraced the opportunities and challenges of the global media culture. Another 
                                                 
21 Obshchaya Gazeta was created in August 1991, bringing together the editorial teams of several 
newspapers that were banned during the abortive coup against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Throughout 
the Boris Yeltsin era, it maintained a reputation for principled liberal criticism, reporting aggressively on the 
controversial issues of Chechnya, state corruption, and privatization. During the 1996 presidential election 
campaign, when virtually all the country’s media—including NTV and the rest of Gusinsky’s empire—thoroughly 
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endorsed Yabloko leader Grigorii Yavlinskii. More details see Robert Coalson, “Banditry as usual?” (RFE/RL 
Newsline, 12 June 2002) 
 
22 Ivan Zssoursky summarizes the four major traits of the newspaper: 1. Full information; 2. Free 
commentary and presentation of all points of view; 3. “No” to editorials with a “united opinion”; 4. Independence, 
and not only form those in power. (Zassoursky, Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia, 38) 
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example reflecting the openness of the Russian media is that in 1992 Dutchman Dirk 
Sauer began publishing the Moscow Times, the first independent English-language 
newspaper in Russia, laying the foundation of the future Independent Media 
Publishing House. 
In the broadcasting system, although the trend of privatization was not as 
notable as it was in the printing media, there were still some breakthroughs. In the 
first place, both TV and radio learned to operate in a market economy. The 
advertisements became a major source of revenue and investment. In December 1991, 
Sergey Lysovski and Vladimir Zhechkov registered the Premier SV Advertising 
Association. The other twelve advertising firms, including RO (Advertising 
Association) Aurora, LIS’S, and TISSA, joined the association as partners.23 
Secondly, several gigantic state-owned television centers were also established. In 
May 1991, the All-Russian State Television and Radio Company (VGTRK), 
established in 1990, began full broadcasting. On December 27, 1991, by presidential 
decree, the government established the Ostankino State Radio and Television 
Company. In May 1992, Mikhail Lesin, Oganes Sobolev and some powerful political 
figures founded the national advertising agency Video International Production 
Company. The establishment of state-controlled television centers and advertising 
agency implied that from the beginning Russian media reform could not get rid of the 
influence of the state and the government. It also implied that Russian media could 
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not be entirely independent from any political power, even though during the best 
period of their development.  
Undeniably, the earlier years of the 1990s were significantly different from 
any period of the Russian media history. Released from the strict control of the old 
regime, journalists for the first time fully enjoyed independence and the media 
professionalism was awakened, and finally reached an unparalleled level. Moreover, 
with the first wave of media privatization thriving, the Russian media were also 
inclined to embrace the global media culture, particularly Western news values and 
presentation style. Nevertheless, the emergence of the state-controlled broadcasting 
organs, to some extent, counteracted the privatization’s positive contribution to media 
freedom.  
3.2 The Continuing Prosperity of Russian Media and the Challenges 
confronted by the Russian media (1992~1996) 
During this period, the country continued to experience the precious media 
freedom. Although the economic realities severely hit the newly born media, the 
Russian media were still independent from government and state. The media 
practitioners maintained the high level of media professionalism, which culminated 
with the campaign against the first Chechnya war. At the same time, when the 
Russian media experienced a metamorphosis from the communist propaganda to the 
Western-style new media, it also struggled to live between “scissors-blades.” One was 
the pressure coming from the dismal economic situation. The other was the pressure 
from the rising power of Yeltsin who intervened into the media affairs by using 
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political power. In fact, Russian media themselves were contradictory. On one hand, 
they wanted to be independent from any power. On the other hand, Russian media had 
to compromise with a complicated political situation. The 1996 presidential election 
was a good example of this awkward position of Russian media.  
3.2.1 The Persistence of Media independence 
The media privatization continued to deepen not only in the press, but also in 
broadcasting. Media independence was still the theme of this period, which was 
strongly strengthened by the diversification of media structure, media operation and 
media ownerships.  
According to Dr. Ivan Zassourasky, the central press was split into three camps: 
democratic press, opposition press and new publications.24 All of them had their own 
viewpoints about media responsibility to society. At the regional level, due to the 
rising cost of delivering the central newspaper to the region, the original hierarchy 
relation between the central and the regional press was loosened. The regional 
authorities started to develop their own newspapers and journals that more 
concentrated on the key economic and ethical local issues. The regional press also 
kept a distance from political issues. The clear differences between the center and 
periphery created a good environment for maintaining media freedom. 
In the broadcasting system, television channels and radio stations had initiated 
their privatization process in the year 1993. In October 1993, the independent 
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commercial television company NTV (Independent Television) made its debut with a 
broadcast of “Itogi” (Summary) on the fifth channel in St. Petersburg. The creation of 
the TV company was financed by a consortium consisting of Most Group, the 
Stolichny (Capital) and National Credit banks. NTV became the first private national 
channel in Russia. At the end of 1993, the radio station Ekho Moskvy (Moscow 
Echo)25 obtained a credit line from Most Bank in exchange for 51 percent of its shares. 
One year later, Yeltsin signed a decree privatizing the formerly Ostankino National 
Broadcasting Company and transforming it into a shareholding company jointly 
owned by the state and the private sectors.26 Simultaneously, this new company was 
renamed as Obshchestvennoye Rossiyskoye Televideniye (Russian Public Television, 
commonly abbreviated “ORT”). In November 1994, the controlling block of shares 
was assigned to the state represented by the State Commission for the Management of 
State Property (GKI). And the remaining shares were divided among four 
banks—MENATEP, Stolichny, Russian Credit, and Inkombank—and two other 
companies, AO Aeroflot-Russian International Airlines and AO AvtoVAZ27. The 
rapid development of private commercial television and radio companies infused new 
blood into the original mainly state-controlled broadcasting system and offered media 
practitioners more opportunities to consolidate the media independence. The media 
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practitioners still maintained a high level of media professionalism that culminated 
with the campaign against the first Chechnya war. 
3.2.2 First Chechnya War 
If the golden period from 1991 to 1992 was the honeymoon of the media and 
the government, then the first Chechnya war was the symbol of their “divorce.” After 
Yeltsin launched the war in Chechnya, the alliance between the press and the 
government fell apart.  
The Chechnya war started in 1994. Yeltsin had hoped to use the victory to 
defeat political opponents and to win the 1996 presidential election. However, the 
reality disappointed him. On the contrary, the Chechnya war became a stain in his 
political affairs and almost made him lose the 1996 election28. Although the Russian 
forces maintained the overwhelming military superiority, they were unable to control 
Chechnya efficiently. Widespread demoralization of the Russian forces and the deaths 
of thousands of civilians compelled Yeltsin to declare a unilateral cease-fire in 1995 
and to begin withdrawing troops a year later.  
During the entire two-year period, the Russian media played a leading role in 
presenting the real face of the war to the public. For the most part, the Russian media 
operated freely in reporting on the Chechen conflict despite government pressure. 
Although the government produced its own information as it did in other wars such as 
Afghanistan, this kind of information was not suitable for the rapidly developed and 
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highly competitive new information market.29 Moreover, the independent media such 
as NTV and ORT questioned official information and figures.30 Journalists tried to 
provide balanced coverage for both sides. That was why many Russian journalists 
went to report from the Chechen side. They told the public that Chechens were not 
only bearded fighters with green headbands, but also the main victims of the attacks. 
However, officials were outraged by this kind of reporting. They considered 
journalists who contacted with the Chechen rebels to be accomplices of terrorists. 
NTV was a case in point. Its bold coverage and the influence of its pictures 
established its creditability and a “counter-authority” image among the Russian 
people. As a result, NTV almost lost its broadcasting license over its unflattering 
coverage of the Chechen war.31 The gap between the government and the mass media 
was deepening as the war stretched on.  
In a word, the first Chechnya war was a sign. On the one hand, it showed the 
media responsibility to the public as the “Fourth Estate.” As a result, according to the 
Ellen Mickiewicz, the conflict in Chechnya finally spelled the end of the old Soviet 
media system.32 On the other hand, the First Chechnya war also presented the 
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conflicts between the government and media, which will be analyzed in detail below.  
3.2.3 Difficulties Undermined Media Freedom 
Although the theme of this period was media independence, many severe 
problems also challenged media freedom.  
To begin with, the Russian economy underwent stress as it transformed from a 
centrally planned economy to a free market system in the earlier years of the 1990s. 
Shock therapy, one of the most radical economic policies, to some extent, speeded up 
the Russian economic transition by allowing prices to balance off supply and demand 
pressures. However, it also shook the economic foundation of Russian society and led 
to the first financial crisis after the collapse of the USSR. As one part of the social 
transition, the Russia media reform also suffered economic difficulty. For instance, by 
the end of 1992 most publications operated at a loss and a sharp decline in circulation 
(For details, see table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.1: Newspaper Circulation Changes 1991~1992 
(in thousand copies) 
Name of 
Publication 
Number of Copies 
as of 1 Jan. 1991 
 
Copies as of 1 Nov. 
1991 
 
Percentage Change
in circulation, Jan.- 
Nov. 1991 
Newspapers    
Izvestiya 3,872.9 2,781.1 -29% 
Komsomolskaya 
Pravda 
17,249.8 12,118.7 -30% 
Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta 
70.0 27.0 -61% 
Moskovskiye 
Novosti 
1,296.8 336.8 -74% 
Sovetskaya Rossiya 1,321.4 780.1 -40% 
Trud 18,291.9 12,320.0 -33% 
Argumenty i Fakty 23,840.7 22,598.9 -5% 
Magazines    
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Novyi Mir 953.0 200.5 -79% 
Ogonek 1723.0 1492.4 -14% 
Znamya 397.3 183.8 -53% 
Source: Izvestia, 18 Nov 1991, 2; JPRS-UPA, 10 Dec 1991, 50-51 
A general problem faced by the newspapers and magazines was that they were 
unable to operate only by their own strength. To avoid shut down, they had to seek 
outside financial support, which came from two sides: One was government subsidies; 
the other was financial magnates. According to Andrei G. Richter, most publications 
willingly accepted state help, except for very few publications, such as Moskovskiye 
Novosti and Kommersant.33 The newspaper Izvestia even received a huge building on 
Pushkin Square as a present from the Gaidar government. The few publications that 
rejected the government subsidies were all supported by powerful business groups 
(this point will be explained below). Supported by the government, the print media, 
though, could not survive the financial catastrophe. Because of the economic crisis, 
the government was unable to provide enough subsidies. The large amount spent on 
media subsidies strained the government budget. Therefore, the print press was 
gradually eclipsed by television, which became far more popular and attracted more 
investment. From the end of 1993 to the middle of 1995, the Russian information 
market was divided by the different business groups such as Media-Most, headed by 
Vladimir Gusinsky, and Kommersant Publishing House led by Yakovlovs, who 
created the daily newspaper Kommersant and Moskovskiye Novosti. Now it is not 
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difficult to understand why Moskovskiye Novosti and Kommersant from the very 
beginning rejected any help from the government. They had private financial 
magnates supporting their operation. 
It is no doubt that due to the economic difficulties, it was hard for the Russian 
media to avoid political influence by the government when receiving its financial help. 
In the meantime, the government also learned that economic pressure provided as 
effective a tool for control over editorial policies as the ideological and political 
dictate exercised by communists. However, this effort was not strong enough to 
threaten the media freedom. Therefore, during this period the press could still criticize 
the government. On the other hand, the rising power of financial magnates limited the 
government’s influence in media. They appeared as the opposite team that balanced 
the state-controlled media system. Media independence and the professionalism of 
journalist were valued by newly privatized media companies at that time.  
Moreover, President Boris Yeltsin was also a potential threat to the Russian 
media freedom. Pushed by Yeltsin, the constitution passed in 1993 created a powerful 
presidency and endowed the president with sweeping powers to issue decrees. From 
then on, the President’s ambition to intervene in media affairs was becoming far more 
obvious. Two edicts in December 1993 clearly showed Yeltsin’s attempt to strengthen 
his own power in media. In only one month, Yeltsin finished a complete restructuring 
of state media in order to consolidate his authority over state television, to expand 
private access to television broadcasting, and to create a potentially powerful new 
media arbitration court.  
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The first decree was signed on December 22, 1993. According to it, the 
Federal Television and Radio Service of Russia34 was founded. At the same time the 
Federal Service of Russia for Television and Radio Broadcasting was also created, 
which was directly led by Yeltsin himself. The Federal Television and Radio 
Broadcasting Service was responsible for both federal and regional broadcasting 
systems, and a Committee for the Press, which dealt with periodicals, publishing 
houses and the state inspectorate.35 The aim to establish these two national media 
management bureaus was obvious. From then on the central government could 
effectively dominate the state-control media resource, including television, radio, 
newspapers, and magazines. And it meant that all the media resources were also 
relevantly collected in the hands of the President. 
A December 29 edict from the Court of Appeals for Information Disputes 
under the President of the Russian Federation was linked explicitly to Articles 29 and 
8036 of the new constitution. The December 29 edict granted citizens the right to 
media freedom, made the President the guarantor of that freedom and created a new 
arbitration body under the President to resolve disputes over television coverage and 
access.37 This decree gave the president a potentially great advantage over the other 
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branches of government in determining the political slant and content of television 
programming. 
Although the media practitioners still kept their independent position and the 
spontaneous privatization gave more opportunities to practice professionalism, the 
economic difficulties and political pressures, more or less, eroded Russian media 
independence. The complete media freedom from 1991 and 1992 was gradually 
weakened. According to the U.S.-based nongovernmental organization Freedom 
House’s Annual Press Freedom Survey, the numerical rankings of Russia from 1992 
to 1995 were 57, 46, 40, and 55, all in the “partly free” range38.  
3.2.4 1996 Presidential Election 
The 1996 presidential election was a good lesson for Russian media 
professional to remember. Although there were many reasons that could explain the 
Yeltsin’s re-election in 1996 such as the public fear the restoration of communism and 
the success of Yeltsin’s campaign strategy, media support was widely regarded as the 
crucial factors in Yeltsin’s re-election.  
It is worth recalling how hopeless Yeltsin’s candidacy appeared just six 
months before the presidential election. In December 1995 parliamentary elections, 
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the pro-government movement “Our Home Is Russia” only gained 10 percent of the 
votes, but the Communist Party gained more than 22 percent.39 Opinion polls showed 
Yeltsin’s approval rating in the single digits, and many Russian professional 
journalists at that time even ridiculed his prospects for the re-election. Nobody 
thought Yeltsin would be re-elected, even the President himself. However, a miracle 
happened. Yeltsin recognized that he would need media support in order to overcome 
these obstacles. Simultaneously, journalists were also understandably alarmed by the 
strong showing of the Communist Party in the parliamentary election. Yeltsin fully 
took advantage of the pessimistic mood of journalists who conceded to Yeltsin simply 
in order to prevent the loss of press freedom likely to follow communism’s return to 
power. Yeltsin also sought support from financial oligarchs who saw the media as a 
useful passport to politics and power in Russia under Yeltsin. Therefore, the oligarchs 
positively participated in the Yeltsin’s campaign and used the money and their 
influence in the public to “buy” the election for Yeltsin. It seemed that the 
straightforward pro-Yeltsin and anti-communist news coverage prevailed everywhere 
in the country overnight. Most criticism of the president disappeared entirely. Yeltsin’s 
heart problems were almost ignored in news reports, although journalists in Moscow 
were clearly aware of the worsening in the president’s health. However, on the other 
side, the coverage about the main communist competitor Gennady Zyuganov, the 
leader of the Communist Party of Russian Federation, was highly critical and 
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misleading. The Russian Public Television network even refused to air the final 
campaign advertisement produced by the Zyuganov campaign.40
NTV is a useful example. As one of the biggest private television networks, 
NTV had a high reputation for credibility and accuracy with the viewers. Especially 
during the Chechen war, NTV was credited with reporting graphic from both sides of 
the conflict. Before the campaign, it was honored by its opposition to the authorities. 
At the beginning of the presidential campaign, the NTV’s attitude towards Yeltsin’s 
administration was negative. Not only did the commentators criticize the presidential 
administration for denying an NTV correspondent’s access to a Kremlin press 
conference, but Igor Malashenko, president of NTV, even predicted that the 
authorities would not dare to embark on a “suicidal” course of threatening the 
media.41 However, less than a month later, Malashenko began working in close 
contact with Yeltsin’s team. He explained that if the private media provided “unbiased, 
professional and objective” campaign coverage, Zyuganov would win the election, 
and journalists would lose their freedom permanently.42
According to the report of European Institute for the Media, “the media bias 
was so pervasive that the 1996 presidential election was free, but not fair.”43 Given 
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the special situation, the goal of media freedom could never be achieved as before due 
to the influences of competing powers. The media independence and freedom were 
too much treasured by the former propaganda workers of the Soviet Union, where the 
media was tightly controlled as a fundamental mechanism of ideological control. Thus, 
the Russian media professionals were much more inclined to compromise with the 
Yeltsin’s administration which was expected to protect the media independence and 
freedom. This can also explain why the media became close allies with the Russian 
authorities from the start of Russian Federation.44  
In conclusion, this period from 1991 to 1996 was the most important time for 
the formation and the development of the Russian media. The Russian media 
experienced their one and the only one golden age after the collapse of the USSR. 
Although they were faced with the double pressures from the economic and political 
sides, the media independence and freedom were well protected by most of media 
practitioners. However, the Yeltsin victory in the 1996 election demonstrated that 
Russian media professionals could be mobilized to advance a particular political 
viewpoint. To a large extent Russian media professionals played a role as a truant. 
They shirked their duty as one of the “four powers.” Nevertheless, at the same time, 
they also deserve sympathy. Since then the Russian mass media entered a new era that 
is marked by the prosperity of Russian media empire and the wane of the Russian 
media professionalism. The following chapter will describe how the big business 
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moguls became powerful and how they worked with the politicians to prevent the 
emergence of the media as an effective independent force for the reform. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE NEW MOGULS 
During four years after the 1996 presidential election, Russian media changed 
dramatically. Yeltsin’s election victory was a watershed. Before the election the 
Russian media were mostly independent and free. However, after the election they 
stepped into a new phase, which was defined by collusion of big business moguls and 
the Kremlin. This chapter includes three parts. In the first part, the rise and boom of 
the major media empires are described in detail. The second part focuses on the 
relationships between the major media empires and the government. The final part 
presents the split between them and considers the behind the scenes reasons. 
4.1 The Boom of Russian Media Empires 
Russian media had been faced with a dilemma since the demise of the Soviet 
Union. On one hand, they were thirsty for independence. Technically speaking, they 
were mature enough to be independent because of the high level of professionalism 
that they already attained. However, the problem was that this kind of professional, 
Western-style journalism in Russia had a very limited audience. As a result, few 
newspapers, magazines, radio stations and television networks were profitable. Given 
these circumstances, journalists who initially owned shares in these companies were 
forced to seek outside funding from banks, corporations and financial groups. This 
process accelerated after the 1996 presidential election. The government’s flattering 
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attitude towards the financial groups offered shrewd businessmen a chance to put their 
feet in door of media. The earliest and most influential media groups were Gusinsky’s 
Media-Most Holding Company (Media-Most) and Berezovsky’s LogoVAZ Holding 
Company.  
4.1.1 Gusinsky and his Media Most Holding Company 
On January 27, 1997, Media-Most, the first Russian media empire was born. 
Its emergence was a significant step in the era of oligarch-controlled Russia. Its 
founder was the most famous banking and media magnate Vladimir Gusinsky, who 
personally owned about 70 percent of shares of this media company. The other three 
shareholders were Igor Malashenko, Yevgeny Kiselyov and Oleg Dobrodeyev, all of 
whom were the creators of the first private television network—NTV television 
network. Gusinsky, like other Russian oligarchs, came from the underground 
economy of the Soviet era. Grasping the chance of the USSR’s demise, Gusinsky 
established his own media empire on the ruins of the old empire. Since 1989 when he 
opened Most, a consulting cooperation for foreign investors in Russia, he aimed to 
become the Russian version of Australian mogul “Rupert Murdoch.”  
Gusinsky’s Media-Most was the flagship of the Russian media privatization. 
In February 1993, the first issue of the newspaper Sevodnya (Today) was published by 
Most Bank. During the same period, with the help of Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, 
he successfully gained control of the television station Channel Four, an educational 
channel formerly controlled by the government. This television station later became 
NTV. The Most Bank also infused capital into the radio station Ekho Moskvy 
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(Moscow Echo) to obtain 51 percent of its shares in the same year. In 1994, a new 
entertainment weekly, Sem dney (Seven days) was created. And a publishing house 
with the same name was also founded. In March 1996, Gusinsky began to publish the 
magazine Itogi (Summary), with Sergei Parkhomenko as editor-in-chief. During the 
first Chechnya War from 1994 to 1996, NTV gained much more popularity among the 
population because of its probing coverage of the real situation in the battles, its 
caustic commentaries and its criticism of the Russian government.  
After the 1996 presidential election Gusinsky altered his strategy subtly: he 
began to cooperate with politicians who could help him achieve his ambitious 
economic goals. Everything developed as Gusinsky predicted and arranged. NTV was 
even granted the right to broadcast nationwide45 because of its “notable” contribution 
to Yeltsin’s victory in 1996 presidential election. What is more, Gusinsky also 
launched a satellite to increase the size of the audience and enlarge the influence of 
the NTV network. Until early 1999, the estimated audience of NTV was around 102 
million. The station covered about 70 percent of Russia’s territory and it was received 
in other former Soviet republics including Belarus, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan 
and the Baltic states.  
Table 4.1: the Business of the Most Media Empire (1993~2000) 
Television 
NTV The group controlled some 70 percent of 
NTV shares, including the satellite cable 
network NTV Plus. NTV was the most 
influential private television network that 
broadcasted nationwide. Its news 
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broadcasts were more popular than those 
on other networks. 
Radio 
Ekho Moskvy The group held a controlling stake. 
Newspaper 
Segodnya, Itogi, Sem Dney The publishing house named Sem Dney 
was fully controlled by the group. The 
daily newspaper Segodnya, the weekly 
Itogi and the entertainment weekly Sem 
Dney were all published by this 
publishing house. 
Obshchaya Gazeta  The group invested in this weekly 
newspaper. 
Novaya Gazeta (New Gazette) The group invested in this weekly 
newspaper. 
Smena (Change) The group gave subsidies to this St. 
Petersburg daily. 
Source: Floriana Fossato and Anna, “Russian Media Empire III”, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Online, 199846. 
4.1.2 Berezovsky and his Media Empire 
Paul Klebnikov described Boris Berezovsky as the Godfather of the 
Kremlin.47 He probably exaggerated the influence of the tycoon and his clan. 
However, the fact is that Russia’s decline was accompanied by Boris Berezovsky’s 
rise. Who is Boris Berezovsky? He held a PhD in mathematics and physics. He was 
the chief executive officer of the LogoVAZ industrial-financial group. He was one of 
the most dangerous rivals, who even made Gusinsky retreat. He was a close friend of 
Yeltsin and his family. He was a key member of a handful of insiders who controlled 
an unpredictable machine named Russia. And finally, he is just Boris Berezovsky, a 
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symbol of Russia’s oligarch era. 
Berezovsky founded his empire from scratch, beginning in business selling 
and importing automobiles. His company LogoVAZ owned the exclusive dealer 
contract with the state auto manufacturer AvtoVAZ, which helped him make his first 
millions. In the meantime, he also entered on the air and oil industry, with the large 
stake of the Russian airline Aeroflot and the oil company Sibneft. However, he was 
never satisfied with his role as a successful entrepreneur. He wanted to be more 
powerful and influential. He diversified his holdings not only in the area of natural 
resources but also expanded them into media. Due to the close relationship with the 
national leader Yeltsin, he gained the ownership of ORT, the state’s largest and most 
influential television network. With voting control of 36 percent of ORT’s shares, he 
effectively ran ORT.48 At the same time, he took the control of other media outlets, 
such as the private TV6 channel, the weekly magazine Ogonyok (Little Fire) and the 
prestigious daily newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Independent Newspaper). In 1997 
Berezovsky also allegedly negotiated to acquire a controlling stake in the 
Kommersant Publishing House that produced the daily Kommersant (Businessmen), 
the weeklies Vlast (Estate) and Dengi (Money) and the entertainment magazines 
Domovoi (Goblin) and Avtopilot (Automatic Pilot). 
Table 4.2: The Business of LogoVAZ Industrial-Financial Group (1993~2001) 
Television 
ORT The group owned 8 percent of ORT and 
also maintains control over some top 
ORT managers, who formerly were top 
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LogoVAZ managers. Obedinionny Bank, 
which was affiliated with LogoVAZ, is 
part of a consortium of four banks that 
own 38 percent of ORT. 
TV6 The group owned 37 percent of shares. 
Magazine 
Ogonyok The group owned the controlling shares 
in this weekly. 
Matador An entertainment magazine 
Newspapers 
Novye Izvestia (Latest News) The group helped finance the creation of 
this new daily. 
Obshchaya Gazeta The group financed this weekly 
newspaper. 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta The group had a controlling stake in the 
daily through Obedinionny Bank. 
Source: Floriana Fossato, “Russian Media Empire III”, Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty Online, 199849.  
4.1.3 Gazprom Media Holding Company 
Faced with the thriving of Gusinsky’s and Berezovsky’s empires, other 
gigantic industrial companies also threw their attention to the media industry. 
Gazprom was among them. This Russian joint-stock company was founded in 
accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on November 5, 
1992 and the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation on 
February 17, 1993. It came into the spotlight when it announced the creation of a new 
subsidiary, Gazprom Media Holding on December 27, 1997.  
After Viktor Ilyushin, previously in charge of relations with the media for 
Gazprom, was appointed to his new post as the head of Gazprom Media Holding, 
Gazprom started to accelerate the process of building the largest media holdings in 
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Russia. At the time when the company was set up, Gazprom owned the Prometei TV 
and Radio Company (Prometheus TV and Radio Company), a controlling block of 
shares in the newspaper Rabochaya tribuna (Worker’s Tribune), 3 percent in ORT, 30 
percent of the shares of NTV and shares of a large number of regional media. 
According to incomplete statistics50, until 1997 Gazprom had subsidized or invested 
in 29 newspapers and television stations. During Yeltsin’s era, Gazprom was not as 
prominent and flamboyant as Media Most or Berezovsky’s empire, but it still exert a 
great influence in re-mapping the Russian media landscape. The existence of 
Gusinsky and Berezovsky, to some degree, eclipsed the prosperity of Gazprom Media. 
However, due to this media situation Gazprom Media Holding could save its strength 
and avoided becoming the target of the new President Vladimir Putin in later years. 
From this point of view, Gazprom was one who got the last laugh. 
Table 4.3: The Major Business of Gazprom Natural Gas Monopoly in Media 
(1992~1999) 
Television 
NTV Gazprom owned 30 percent stake. 
ORT Gazprom owned 3 percent shares 
Prometei Prometei was a TV production project 
Gazprom promoted based in Moscow. 
Gazprom also developed a regional 
project based on gas sector resources in 
the regions. 
Newspapers 
Pabochaya Tribuna Gazprom had the controlling stake in this 
daily newspaper. 
Trud (Labor) Gazprom gave the subsidies to this daily. 
Komsomolskaya Pravda (Komsomol Before March 1997, the company gave 
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Truth) subsidies to this daily51. 
Various Gazprom owned more than 100 regional 
publications. 
Source: Floriana Fossato and Anna, “Russian Media Empire III”, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Online, 199852.  
4.1.4 Luzhkov and his Moscow Power Group 
The final heavyweight is the Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. Luzhkov had been 
the mayor of Moscow since 1992. During the period from 1996 to 1999 he was able 
to wield unprecedented power over the capital city’s government. Klebnikov 
mentioned that in a country where everything was collapsing, there was an oasis of 
prosperity and success.53 It was Moscow, Luzhkov’s Moscow. He had his own 
television channel, TV Tsenter (TV Center) and famous newspaper Moskovsky 
Komsomolets (Komsomol of Moscow). He was backed by a widely diversified telecom 
investment conglomerate called Sistema (System). Unlike other moguls who tried to 
step into the political arena, Luzhkov was already a political star. He himself was a 
combination of media and politics. It reflected a special phenomenon in Russia: the 
Russian media could never cut off their relations with politics. Media politicalization 
and politics medialization have been entangled with each other since the collapse of 
the USSR. It is extremely hard to draw a line between these two in Russia.  
Table 4.4: The Media Business under Control of Moscow City Government 
(1996~1999) 
Television 
TV Tsenter The government owned 67 percent of 
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shares in the TV Tsenter consortium. The 
consortium included Center TV, which 
aimed to become a network with 
nationwide broadcasting capabilities; a 
pool of Moscow cable networks; and the 
satellite cable project, METEOR TV. 
TV6 The city government owned shares in this 
private television network before it was 
closed down. 
REN TV The creation of this private network was 
financed by the Bank of Moscow, which 
was controlled by city authorities. 
Newspapers 
Metropolis This new publishing house, reportedly 
linked to the Moscow city government, 
was created in April 199854. 
Obshchaya Gazeta Moscow city government owned shares 
in this weekly 
Moskovsky Komsomolets The city gave subsidies to this 
large-circulation daily.  
Source: Floriana Fossato and Anna, “Russian Media Empire III”, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Online, 199855.  
4.2 The Collusion of the Media Empires and Kremlin 
As noted before, financial troubles immediately threatened the existence of 
most media outlets in the 1990s.56 Although the direct state subsidies helped many 
Moscow-based media outlets survive during the early 1990s, the large amount spent 
on media subsidies strained the government budget. Nevertheless, the Kremlin didn’t 
want to lose its control in media. Hence, the Kremlin appealed for the financial aid 
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from super bank groups. That was the origin of the collusion between the media 
empires and the Kremlin which led to the rise of a special group of people, who are 
known as “Oligarchs.” They probably could not exert the same influence as the 
moguls in Wall Street, but they were tougher and more impressive.57 They played a 
crazy game without rules, in which everyone could be a winner overnight, but could 
also be killed without warning. The secret to survive was to find a mighty politician as 
a protector. Looking at the super rich, it is easy to find that almost behind every media 
baron stood a strong and influential political figure: Gusinsky and Luzhkov were very 
good friends. Berezovsky was not only the intimate confidant of Yeltsin, but also a 
close friend with president’s family. Victor Chernomyrdin, the former soviet minister 
and Yeltsin’s longest serving prime minister, took Gazprom private.  
The oligarchs and the political powers started to enjoy their honeymoon with 
the media empires developing at an unprecedented speed. When the government gave 
away the prized state companies to tycoons, the collusion process was formalized. 
After the 1996 presidential election, the collusion became much more brazen. In 
August 1996, right after Yeltsin was sworn in as president, Vladimir Potanin, who 
founded the Oneximbank/Interros Group, was named first deputy prime minister. Two 
months later, Berezovsky was appointed deputy head of the Security Council. 
Gusinsky’s NTV was also granted permission to start round-the-clock broadcasting 
and go nationwide during the same period. Evidently, all of these oligarchs made 
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special contributions to Yeltsin’s victory. In 1997, Viktor Ilyushin, a former assistant 
to President Yeltsin, became head of the Gazprom Media Holding. His appearance in 
the leadership of Gazprom-Media was regarded as a sign of the formation of a media 
company to support Chernomyrdin in the presidential elections in 2000. At the 
beginning of March, 1997, Luzhkov issued a resolution on a tender among Moscow 
advertising agencies for the right to conclude direct rental agreements for advertising 
space with the Moscow government. In September 1997, Yeltsin invited to the 
Kremlin some of the country’s biggest financial and media magnates. Yeltsin told 
them to stop “fighting” with each other through the media. Floriana Fossato and Anna 
Kachkaeva emphasized this in their report “Russia: Financial Interests Continue to 
Control Media Outlets”58: Judging from his words, Yeltsin indirectly acknowledged 
that financial interests controlled the editorial line of Russia’s media outlets, at least of 
the central ones, based in Moscow. In fact, by the end of 1997 it was difficult to find a 
Moscow-based newspaper that did not have direct or indirect link with financial 
factors or political power.  
Given this social environment, it was more difficult to maintain media 
independence and media freedom. It was challenged by the new financial dependence 
on super industry and bank groups in collusion with the central government. The 
Russian media practitioners were unable to maintain their purity and professional 
ethics when their survival mostly relied on economic and political super powers. The 
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newspaper Segodnya was a case in point. The creation of the newspaper Segodnya in 
1993 aimed to create “a respectable, professional media outlet that everybody in the 
Kremlin and in government would read.”59 However, as circulation of the paper 
declined Segodnya was unable to make a profit through advertising in Russia’s 
under-developed advertising sector. Confronted by the new goal of making profits, 
which was required by the owners, several sections of newspapers were cut, including 
culture and entertainment. The majority of editors, feeling it would be impossible to 
maintain previous levels of professionalism while trying to target the audience of 
sensationalist publications, did not want to remain in the new Segodnya. So they left. 
The decline of professionalism was also embodied in consolidating the censorship. In 
February 1996 Yeltsin fired Oleg Poptsov, chairman of the All-Russia Television and 
Radio Company (VGTRK), reportedly for publishing a critical book, A Chronicle of 
the Times of Tsar Boris, and also because of outspoken reporting on Chechnya.60  
In the meantime, a series of media policies that strengthened the state control 
of media were also brought into effect. For instance, on August 25, 1997, a 
presidential decree intended to improve state TV broadcasting in the Russian 
Federation was issued.61 Relying on this decree, the Kultura TV (Culture TV) was 
established. The goal in creating this state-owned channel was to strengthen the role 
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of the state in electronic mass media, to develop a single comprehensive national 
information sphere, and to restore the cultural and educational role of state TV in the 
Russian Federation. On December 19, 1997, a State Duma decree on the state 
regulation of the activities of the NTV Television Company and other non-state 
television and radio companies was also issued62. This decree required domestic 
televisions, especially the private TV stations, to reflect the opinion of political, 
religious, ethnic and other groups of the population and create the requisite conditions 
for the preservation of ethnic culture, for stabilizing the social and political situation 
in the Russian Federation.  
In the last year of his tenure, Yeltsin signed a decree on July 6 to dismiss 
Russia’s State Press Committee and the Federal Service for Television and Radio 
Broadcasting63. It was replaced by a Ministry for Press, Television, Radio 
Broadcasting and Mass Communication. Commenting on the measure, Prime Minister 
Sergei Stepashin said at a cabinet meeting held that day: “I would not say that we 
want to create a propaganda ministry. But we are starting to create a federal strategy 
which would consolidate all of the state’s capabilities in—pardon the old-fashioned 
word—ideological work.”64 Although the Kremlin did not admit its attempt to 
consolidate the role of the state in mass communication, yet, from his word, the 
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conclusion was evident that the Russian media under the Yeltsin’s era were still not 
free as defined in the West. It was, more or less, influenced by the authority of the 
government and the state. 
Moreover, the most serious problem faced with the Russian media was 
physical violence against journalists. On February 26, 1996 Felix Solovyov, a 
free-lance photographer who published a portfolio on the Russian mafia in Bild am 
Sonntag in Germany, was shot in Moscow.65 On March 11 of the same year Victor 
Pimenov, a cameraman for a pro-Moscow Chechen TV station, was killed in Grozny 
while filming aftereffects of the Chechen’s March 6-9 raid on the city.66 On May 9, 
1996 Nina Yefimova, a contributor to Vozrozhdeniye, was killed in Leninsky District 
of Grozny, reportedly because of stories on crime in Chechnya.67 On June 18, 1998 
Larisa Yudina, editor-in-chief of Sovetskaia Kalmykia Segodnya (the only opposition 
paper in Russian Republic of Kalmykia), was killed in Kalmykian capital Elista.68  
4.3 The Split between the Oligarchs and the Kremlin 
On the surface, the oligarchs and the Kremlin were so close that they were 
willing to share everything. However, driven by the different interests their seemingly 
intimate relationships were desperately brittle. In fact, the conflict always existed. 
                                                 
65 Monroe E. Price, Andrei Richter, and Peter K. Yu, “A Brief Chronology of Russian Media Law and 
Policy During the Yeltsin Years”, Russian Media Law and Policy in the Yeltsin Decade: Essays and Documents, 
(Published by Kluwer Law International, 2002) 306-307 
 
66 Monroe Price, 306 
 
67 Monroe Price, 306 
 
68 Monroe Price, 307 
 
 54
Before 1998 the frictions among them were not serious enough to affect their 
cooperation. But Russia’s deepening economic crisis in 1998 escalated the conflict, 
which ultimately caused the split between oligarchs and the government. Their 
breakup was also a signal that the Russian media started to shift from the privately 
controlled to the state-controlled. The key figure during this split process was the 
former Russian President Boris Yeltsin who had wanted to be the tsar of Russia for a 
long time. 
On May 27, 1998, at the opening ceremony of the conference of the 
International Press Institute, Yeltsin expressed his concern over the influence some of 
Russia’s leading business tycoons had over media assets they controlled. He asserted 
that media owners were sometimes the worst censors and they were the biggest threat 
to Russia’s press freedom.69 At the same time he argued that he was the only 
guarantor of the free press in Russia.70 In the same month Yeltsin also signed a decree 
to create a production and technical media-holding company, including all 
state-owned electronic media on the basis of VGTRK. His aim was apparent: 
according to this decree, the fully state-owned VGTRK, which also managed the 
channel Kultura and Radio Russia, would replace ORT as the main channel of 
Russia’s television. The creation of this media-holding also aimed to allow 
government to re-establish control of the media assets in which money and managers 
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were controlled by influential businessmen.  
The deepening cleavage was caused not only by the consolidation of state’s 
influence in media arena, but also by the economic crisis in 1998. Hit by the global 
recession, the media owners underwent a severe winter. They seemed not to have 
sufficient financial resources to support the development of their media outlets. 
Because many media assets were involved in the financial investments of media 
owners, it is not surprising to see the big loss of privately controlled media when the 
economic crisis came. On one hand, the advertising dropped sharply. The dramatic 
decline in advertising revenues had severe consequences on the normal operation of 
most Russian media. Many TV networks could not afford the production costs of the 
programs. Just as Oleg Dobrodeev, general director of NTV, pointed out that the 
economic situation obliged television networks to produce cheap programs for 
survival71. On the other hand, since many banks went bankrupt, it became much more 
difficult for the media to withdraw money from their bank accounts, even for those 
controlled by financial holdings. According to a Radio Liberty analysis, “the financial 
pressures on Russia’s privately owned media both from without and within had the 
effect of shifting the balance between privately owned and state-owned media in the 
direction of the latter.”72 Naturally, confronted with the economic crisis, editors and 
journalists were also forced to compromise with the government or their patrons by 
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neglecting their journalism ethics and standards on many issues.  
Besides the economic crisis, the information war between the media owners 
also weakened the privately owned media and offered an opportunity to Yeltsin and 
his administration to take back the control over the media. The information war 
exploded in the summer of 1999 mainly between two media tycoons Berezovsky and 
Gusinsky. The origin of this “war” was the disagreement on the common candidate 
for 2000 president candidates. Gusinsky’s NTV apparently supported the 
populist—Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. However, Berezovsky who was on the side 
of Yeltsin had another plan. So during the whole summer, the Russian audiences had 
to watch what Radio Liberty called “a not-very-understandable information war that 
few people outside Moscow care about”.73 Since then the original partially 
independent Russian media became the propaganda tools of a handful of powerful 
people. For most ordinary Russian people, media freedom and independence became 
a reachless dream once again.  
From other viewpoints, the split among the financial elite, to some degree, 
reflected the long-standing rift among the central government. At that time the 
Russian cabinet was divided into different camps: (1)Yeltsin; (2) the young reformers, 
represented by First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais and Boris Nemtsov; 
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(3)Victor Chernomyrdin and (4)Yuri Luzhkov. However, beyond all expectation, 
Yeltsin won this powerful bout eventually by choosing an iron-handed heir, Vladimir 
Putin, the former KGB officer. His appearance not only crushed the hope of the 
oligarchs, but also reshuffled the Russian media, leading to a most dismal and 
world-shaking outcome. The next chapter will mainly focus on Putin’s media policy 
and the media situation under him. 
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CHAPTER V 
PUTIN’S THREATS TO THE RUSSIAN MEDIA REFORM 
When Yeltsin left the Kremlin and handed the power as a New Year gift to 
Vladimir Putin, when a name “Putin” began to appear in daily newspapers and TV 
programs, Russia moved closer to the collapse of media freedom. Just as Russian 
Union of Journalists (RUJ)74 General Secretary Igor Yakovenko said, “Over the last 
few years, we have definitely moved backward both in terms of human rights and the 
freedom of the press.”75 Unlike Yeltsin, who had been accustomed to partnership with 
media tycoons, Putin preferred subordination and loyalty. Unlike Yeltsin, who had 
offered media opportunities to maintain their independence and dignity, Putin 
demonstrated an open desire to keep tight control over media.  
In this chapter, five separate elements of Putin’s drama will be considered in 
detail. The first section is the 2000 presidential election. The second section focuses 
on how Putin seized the private media. The third section analyzes the limitation on the 
coverage of second Chechnya war. The fourth section presents Putin’s media policy in 
the terrorists’ incident and analyzes the laws that followed. And the final section 
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describes how Putin consolidate legal power on media. 
5.1 The 2000 Presidential Election 
On August 9, 1999, Yeltsin dismissed the short-lived Sergey Stepashin’s 
government and appointed Putin as the acting premier. One week later Putin was 
appointed as the prime minister of Russia. Putin, a political unknown, made his debut 
on the national stage. This was Russia’s sixth change of prime minister in the 18 
months since Yeltsin replaced Victor Chernomyrdin with the young and little known 
fuel and energy minister Sergey Kiriyenko in March 1998. Many people assumed that 
Putin’s cabinet could not avoid being dismissed during Yeltsin’s permanent cabinet 
reshuffles. No one realized that he was the true heir. Some people even thought that 
his appointment was something of a joke.76 However, Putin, Mr. Nobody, finally 
defeated the suspicions. Sharp and crafty as Yeltsin expected, Putin succeed in 
winning popularity among the people through his impressive political keenness and 
unrelenting approach to the renewed crisis in Chechnya. Although the strong 
presidential candidates Primakov and Yuri Luzhkov tried their best to prevent Putin 
becoming the Yeltsin’s heir, yet, Putin won victory in the 2000 presidential election.  
Compared with the 1996 election, in which Yeltsin and oligarchs colluded 
closely in the camouflage of anticommunism, the 2000 election was even more brazen. 
During the campaign, the Russian media no longer existed as an independent 
institutional body, but played as real weapons of different camps. On the eve of 
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election, the main forces were clearly distributed into two blocs. Ivan Zassoursky 
described these two blocs as two parallel parties77: one was led by Primakov, 
Luzhkov and a number of regional governors. The other was the central government, 
the Kremlin, secretly manipulated by Yeltsin and Berezovsky. Each of them controlled 
substantial media resources. (See the table 5.1 and 5.2)  
The Kremlin supported Putin as the presidential candidate.  
Table 5.1: Media Resources Controlled by the Kremlin 
(On the Eve of 1999 Duma Election) 
Television 
Channel II network  The state fully owned the nationwide Channel II Network of 
VGTRK, commonly known outside Russia as RTR.  
ORT As was introduced in previous chapter, ORT (Russian Public 
Television) was Russia’s main channel. State controlled 51 
percent share, but Boris Berezovsky was considered as the real 
owner and ruler of this media company at that time. 
TV6 The company was controlled by the Berezovsky. 
Radios: Radio Rossiya, Radio I, Radio Mayak 
Newspapers 
Rossiyskaya Gazeta 
(Russian Gazette) 
The government’s official daily 
Rossiyskie Vesti 
(Russian News) 
Until 28 April 1998 this publication was the presidential 
administration’s official daily. 
Parlamentskaya 
Gazeta 
(Parliamentary 
Gazette) 
Since May 1998, this publication became the Federation 
Assembly’s (State Duma and Federation Council) official 
daily. 
News Agencies:  Itar-Tass, RIA Novosti, All-Russian Technical 
Source: Floriana Fossato and Anna Kachkaeva, “Russian Media Empire V”, Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty Online, 199978
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From the regional side, they supported Primakov as the presidential candidate.  
 
Table 5.2: Media Resources Controlled by the Regional Bloc 
(On the Eve of 1999 Duma Election) 
Television 
NTV NTV was the backbone of Media-Most controlled by 
Gusinsky 
TV Tsenter TV Tsenter was controlled by Luzhkov’s media holding 
company. 
Radio: Ekho Moskvy 
Newspapers: Metropolis, Movskovskaya Pravda, Obshchaya Gazeta 
Source: Floriana Fossato and Anna Kachkaeva, “Russian Media Empire V”, Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty Online, 199979
Two familiar names stood out in the tables: Berezovsky and Gusinsky. Both of 
them were oligarchs; both of them were confidants of powerful political figures; both 
of them could exert enormous influence on Russia’s politics and economy. They 
mobilized all their media resources to influence the outcome of the election.  
In the case of Putin, television was an important element of his campaign. By 
virtue of his position as prime minister and acting president, he was assured coverage 
of his daily activities. Although Putin received the lion’s share of news coverage on 
all television networks, he was treated especially favorably on Berezovsky-controlled 
Russian Public Television (ORT), the Channel I broadcaster, and on fully state-owned 
Russian Television (RTR), the Channel II broadcaster. According to RUJ, supported 
by the European Commission in Russia, the entire coverage of Putin on RTR in the 
2000 presidential election accounts for 26 percent, which was much higher than the 
coverage of other president candidates such as Gennady Zyuganov (15 percent), 
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Vladimir Zhirinovsky (9 percent), Grigory Yavlinsky (8 percent).80 In addition, Sergei 
Dorenko, a very famous news anchor on state television, was assigned to demoralize 
Luzhkov and Primakov in his TV program. Behind Dorenko stood Berezovsky.81 On 
the last day when campaigning was allowed, Putin gave a three-minute address urging 
citizens to turn out to vote. That address was broadcast in full at the beginning of 
every ORT and RTR newscast on March 24.82  
Above all, Putin’s victory profited from the massive coverage of Chechnya. 
On the election day an ORT newsreader even made the connection in an unusually 
explicit manner during an afternoon newscast: “Today’s reports from Chechnya yet 
again confirm that as soon as possible, the country needs to elect an active president 
who can cope with [Chechen] fighters and bring the anti-terrorist operation to its 
conclusion.”83 The subtext of his comments was clear: Putin, the only one who had 
the policies directly associated with the Chechnya war, was the best choice as the next 
president. 
At the same time, the journalists who were in the fear of being fired also 
pushed the media bias reach to the unprecedented pitch. Kirill Byelyaninov, a 
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Moscow-based journalist who worked both for a Luzhkov television program and 
Berezovsky newspaper, acknowledged: 
It’s clear to all of us which camp the owner belongs to, and what 
information is allowed. I cannot write anything concerning Berezovsky 
himself, or his business partners or ventures, and of course I cannot 
touch the Kremlin. With Luzhkov, I cannot write about Moscow or the 
city authorities…I dig up dirt on both. If it’s dirt on Berezovsky I put it 
in the program, and if it’s dirt on Luzhkov then it goes in the 
newspaper.84  
Unquestionably, Berezovsky played an indispensable part in Putin’s 2000 
election victory. He not only convinced Yeltsin that Putin was a completely reliable, 
loyal member of the President family85, but also made use of the national television 
channel ORT and influential newspapers to create the image of Putin as “a man of 
action,” capable of protecting people in the time of war, and to remold Putin from 
nobody into a widely known political heavyweight. However, life was unpredictable. 
When Berezovsky was proud of himself as a king-maker, he probably never thought 
that he would become the target of Putin, the new king of Russia. 
5.2 The Triumph of Putin in Fighting with the Oligarchs 
Since he was the acting prime minister, the business-minded Putin realized the 
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sacramental significance of controlling media resources. The 2000 presidential 
election confirmed idea once again. Putin was not like drunk, old and tired Yeltsin. On 
the contrary, he is aggressive, iron-handed and power thirsty. He prefers obedience, 
rather than power sharing. Therefore, right after he became the President, he 
embarked on seizing up private media.  
5.2.1 Gusinsky’s Downfall 
The first target was another Vladimir. During the presidential campaign, 
Vladimir Gusinsky firmly stood with Putin’s rivals, Primakov and Luzhkov. NTV’s 
main analytical weekly program, “Itogi” (Summary), even presented the presidential 
administration as a threat to freedom of expression.86 It probably enraged Putin and 
gave him an excuse to start a fight with the oligarchs. Only four days after Putin was 
sworn in, police raided Media-Most’s headquarters. The most influential media mogul 
Gusinsky was arrested because of the embezzlement charges. It was reported that 
Gazprom extended direct or indirect loans totaling at least $380 million to 
Media-Most87. Some of those loans had already come due. However, things were not 
as simple as it represented publicly. To a large extent, Gusinsky was punished by 
Putin’s government for voicing opposition rather than the embezzlement.  
By 1999, Gusinsky reversed to his critical attitude towards the Yeltsin 
government and carried on his network a series of reports about the Yeltsin family and 
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friends running the Kremlin. The newspapers under Gusinsky published many articles 
on official corruption, notably in the security services. For instance, his Novaya 
Gazeta (New Gazette) was a muckraking Moscow newspaper known for controversial 
exposes of official corruption and other scandals. Yeltsin did nothing to force 
Gusinsky off air, but Putin was another story. He was not only unsatisfied with 
Gusinsky’s arrogant attitude, but also outraged by the lack of respect shown him in 
NTV’s broadcasting. The popular NTV program “The Puppets” even made Putin a 
caricature.88 Especially when NTV was critical of Putin’s policies during the second 
Chechnya war, the new king took action.  
In the case of Gusinsky’s downfall, the entire process occurred as a result of 
well-planned operation. Its aim was to establish state control over the privately owned 
media resources. First of all, the Kremlin exerted some financial pressures on 
Media-Most Holding by refusing to grant a state credit to NTV. Moreover, the 
advertising company Video International that had exclusive rights to run commercials 
on NTV also refused to continue its cooperation with NTV in December 1999. Hit by 
a series of financial crisis, Gusinsky’s media empire gradually became a chronic 
money loser and was deeply indebted, surviving only on loans from Gazprom and the 
Luzkhov-controlled Bank of Moscow. Then the Kremlin took its second step in using 
force. Exactly a month after the raid a new attack took place. Vladimir Gusinsky was 
arrested on June 11. He was accused of embezzlement of state property in connection 
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with the privatization of a television production company in St. Petersburg, Russkoe 
Video (Russian Video). After that, through a series of deliberately manipulated court 
trials, Gazprom took over NTV by assuming the debt owed by Media-Most to 
Gazprom. Within a year after Putin’s election, Gusinsky went from being a would-be 
kingmaker to living in self-imposed exile. His once-influential media conglomerate 
Media-Most dissolved into bankruptcy because of a cut-off in credits by state-owned 
and state-allied businesses, and under the weight of criminal and civil court decisions.  
The whole process of taking control NTV took place when Putin was out of 
Moscow. Putin could simply claim that he had nothing to do with the controversy 
over NTV’s incident. However, the move towards NTV was widely regarded as the 
Putin’s government’s repression against the media freedom of Russia. After Gazprom 
controlled NTV, all the other Gusinsky’s media entities such as daily newspapers, 
magazines and radio-channel were also shut down.  
5.2.2 When Godfather of Kremlin Met with Czar of Kremlin… 
Although Berezovsky was widely regarded as the one of the main contributors 
to Putin’s rise to power, yet he still could not escape from being arrested. Soon after 
Gusinsky’s downfall and the collapse of Vladimir Potanin who was also accused of 
underpaying for the privatization of Norisk Nikel Company, Berezovsky became the 
next target of Putin’s anti-oligarch policy. With the tax officers starting to investigate 
the business of automaker AvtoVAZ which had links with his car dealer LogoVAZ, 
Berezovsky was brought into spotlight once again. But this time he was retreated as 
not a hero, but a villain.  
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The main conflict concentrated on the ownership of the Public Russian 
Television, ORT. ORT is the biggest TV channel in the country with total penetration 
of 98 percent of the Russian territory or 140 million viewers. Due to its reputation and 
the nationwide influence, ORT had a high propaganda value. It would become the 
backbone of the Putin’s comprehensive state media empire. However, the only 
obstacle in front of Putin was Berezovsky, who was the real runner and reportedly 
owned the 49 percent of ORT shares. Therefore, while grabbing the ownership of 
ORT, Putin would absolutely challenge the authority of Berezovsky. The colossal 
property of Berezovsky was welcome, but not Berezovsky himself. As a result, Putin 
always looked for chances to crackdown this so-called Mr. Untouchable. In the 
meantime, Berezovsky also realized that taming Putin was more difficult than taming 
Yeltsin. He even made a conclusion in an explicit manner that if Putin did not stop 
from gathering all power to himself soon, he would leave no room for any 
independent political actors.89 Hence, after 2000 election the interests of the Putin’s 
government and Berezovsky developed in different directions.  
Berezovsky was in open defiance criticizing Putin for his slow response to the 
deadly sinking of the Russian nuclear submarine Kursk. He was also critical of the 
administrative reforms Putin implemented. Meanwhile, changing his role in 
provoking anti-Chechen public opinion during the election, Berezovsky was against 
continuing the war in Chechnya and called for the conflict to be settled politically as 
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soon as possible.90
From the other side, Putin started a counterattack. On July 8, 2000, Putin 
announced in his address that Russia would no longer tolerate “shady groups,” which 
intently alluded to Berezovsky. Faced with this, Berezovsky soon announced his plans 
to create an opposition party led by regional governors and other influential figures 
who were threatened by Putin’s drive for power. At the end of 2000 the prosecution 
declared Berezovsky the main suspect in the misappropriation of large sums from 
Aeroflot—Russia’s national airline, in which he owned large stakes. Berezovsky left 
Russia in the same year. In March 2003, he was arrested in London but released on 
bail. In October he was granted political asylum in the United Kingdom. His stake in 
ORT (now First Channel) was sold and his own TV6 channel was closed. 
Following the war between Godfather of the Kremlin and Czar of the Kremlin, 
media freedom was one of the major victims. Initially, TV6 was an independent 
television channel, inheriting the mission of NTV. After the Kremlin took control over 
NTV, many of NTV’s best journalists moved to TV6, where they hoped to work as 
media professionals. However, only one year later a Russian court shut down TV6 as 
well, using the same juridical process as taking over the NTV. The closure of TV6 
sent a warning message to other journalists: criticizing the Kremlin can be bad for 
business, or even worse for journalism.  
After Putin closed the TV6 in 2002, the last network independent of the 
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government, Russians around the country had access to only three major networks, 
ORT, RTR(Russian State TV) and NTV, all controlled in various ways by the state. 
Since 1999 ORT gained a market share of about 50 percent, RTR became the second 
(about 20 percent of the market), followed by NTV (12 percent).91 Following the 
dismantling of two media empires, the previous seven oligarchs were also challenged. 
Other oligarchs also felt the hand of the state on their shoulder. In parallel with 
Berezovsky, there was metal magnate Potanin with a lawsuit challenging the 
privatization of his Norilsk Nickel Company. Vagit Alexperov, president of Lukoil, 
was charged with tax fraud later in July 2000. Auto giant AvtoVaz and Roman 
Abramovich’s Sibneft were both subject to tax inspections. However, none of these 
threats led to any arrest or legal actions, but they served their purpose of warning the 
oligarchs. The recent one was Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the leader of Russian biggest 
petroleum company YUKOS, who was convicted on fraud and tax evasion, and was 
arrested in 2003. 
In summary, we can see that attacks on the oligarchs followed a similar 
pattern:  
(1) To audit the financial situation of these media groups;  
(2) To trap the oligarchs in the crisis of financial lawsuits; 
(3) To lift the business license of these companies;  
(4) To let the state-control industry company take over these oligarch’s media empires, 
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to reappoint the leaders, and to re-employ the unemployed professional journalists 
of these bankrupt companies.  
5.3 The Second Chechen War (1999~ present) 
Another case that showed Putin’s attack on the media freedom is the coverage 
of second Chechen war.  
As early as the presidential campaign, the massive coverage of Chechnya 
worked to Putin’s advantage. Due to lopsided majorities of Russians as a just war 
against “terrorists,” Russia’s brutal assault on Chechnya was just as enthusiastically 
hailed by the whole country. Almost every television network devoted substantial 
coverage to Chechnya, which was usually the most newsworthy story of the day. The 
state television networks were extraordinary.92 However, compared with some 
networks such as NTV, which were not optimistic about the way the military 
campaign was progressing, ORT and RTR were quite upbeat. They often emphasized 
the bright side of the story: the village was captured, the “bandits” suffered greater 
losses.93 To some degree, the war coverage was a trump card of Putin in 2000 
election. 
What is more, Putin was also described by these media as a “man of action,” 
who was strong enough to protect the country from the threat of Chechnya. In contrast 
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Belin, “How State Television Aided Putin’s Campaign,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Russian Election Report 
(April 7, 2000) 6–9. 
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to the first Chechen war, a strong mood of patriotism was widespread. Putin benefited 
from the rise of the patriotic sentiment caused by the war and played a prominent role 
in leading and coordinating the fighting with what he called Chechen “terrorists.” His 
language was brutal and his means was cruel. He was uncompromising in his 
determination to exterminate what he saw as a terrorist nest in Chechnya, stating that 
Russian forces would “be following terrorists everywhere. If we catch them in a toilet, 
then we will bury them in their own crap.”94
However, the enemies of Putin were not only Chechen “terrorists,” but also 
those insubordinate journalists. Having failed to dominate the news agenda during the 
first war in Chechnya, the Russian authorities managed to minimize criticism of the 
second military campaign in Chechnya. In order to prevent correspondents from 
gathering and reporting information that contradicted official statements about the 
fighting, the authorities tightly controlled journalists’ movement in Chechnya and 
imposed special accreditation requirements.95 In Chechnya journalists are mainly 
located at two locations: the Russian military base in Khankala and the complex of 
buildings of the Moscow-backed Chechen government in Grozny. Without special 
permission they were restricted to these two places to produce their reports and they 
were also closely watched by the government. Any movement around Chechnya was 
possible only in the presence either of soldiers or officials, or as a part of some 
                                                 
94 ITAR-TASS 24 September 1999. This is the text which appears in the translated version of Sergey 
Kovalev’s essay “Putin’s War” New York Review of Books, 10 February 2000. 
 
95 Rick Fawn and Stephen White, Russia after Communism,( Great Britain: Antony Rowe Ltd., 2002) 
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delegation.96 Although a great number of them were professionals, dangers were real, 
and several journalists were kidnapped or even killed. In July 1999 Vladimir Yatsina, 
an ITAR-TASS photographer and correspondent, was kidnapped and then, in 2000, 
killed in Ingushetia.97 On October 29, 1999, TV-Tsenter correspondent Ramzan 
Mezhidov and Grozny TV cameraman Shamil Gigayev were killed.98 On May 12, 
2000, the TV program “Nashe Vremya” (Our Time) photographer and correspondent 
Alexander Yefremov was killed.99 On November 20, 2000, TV cameraman Adam 
Tepsurgayev was killed.100  
Moreover, Putin also opened a government briefing center dedicated to 
eliminating independent journalism about Chechnya. Some critical journalists were 
even detained by the government. Andrei Babitsky was one of the victims. A Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty correspondent, he was detained in January 2000.101 He 
was widely known for challenging the Kremlin’s restrictions on Chechen war 
coverage. Nevertheless, his activities were regarded by Russian authorities as treason. 
He was accused of as conspiracy with Chechen terrorists just because he reported 
                                                 
96 Ilya Maksakov, “Russian Journalists in Second Chechnya War,” trans. Prague Watchdog, 12 
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from Chechen side. His case was not an isolated one. On January 17, 2000, the Police 
apprehended Alexander Khinshtein, a Moskovesky Komsomolets (Komsomol of 
Moscow) journalist, who had published critical articles on the Chechen War. They 
attempted to take him to a psychiatric clinic outside of Moscow.102 Their treatments 
sent a message to other Russian journalists that those who challenged the authorities 
could expect to be branded as “enemies of the state.103” On October 9, 2001, Anna 
Politkovskaya, a journalist specializing in the Chechen problem for Novoya Gazeta, 
announced that she was forced into leaving Moscow for Vienna, Austria, following 
death threats because of her reporting, in particular an article talking about the fact 
that a military helicopter with General Anatoli Psdniakov on board was shot down on 
September 17, 2001.104
One of major goals of the government information policy was to hide the true 
figures of Russian military casualties. Afraid that the public mood would directly 
influence the popularity of the President, Putin’s administration did not want this issue 
to inflame the Russian people. Outwardly, the administration seemed to be successful 
in controlling the war coverage in Chechnya. Nevertheless, as the war continued, 
different kinds of bombings suicides and hostage incidents emerged endlessly in 
Moscow and other Russian major cities. It caused huge panic among the 
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population.105 How did President Putin cope with these terrorist acts, particularly, 
how was news reporting distorted in those hostage takings? In the next section these 
two questions are addressed. 
5.4 The Putin’s Media Policies in the Hostage Crisis 
Two dates linked to terrorism remain fixed in Russian memory. One is 
Moscow theater hostage crisis on October 23, 2002. The other is the Beslan school 
siege on September 1, 2004. Putin and the controlled media played an ignominious 
role in dealing with these tragedies.  
During the Moscow theater hostage, the major Russian media, especially the 
television covered the crisis coverage aggressively. They used comprehensive live 
coverage of the hostage incident. Some journalists even helped the operational staff 
establish contact with the terrorists. However, the Kremlin was apparently not 
satisfied with coverage. They criticized the reporting by some Russian news media, 
saying coverage favored the rebels’ cause and threatened counter-terror operations. 
The Russian Media Ministry issued warnings to several Russian news providers, and 
even shut down the Moskoviya Television Station (Moscow TV Station) for its 
violations of the existing legislation by broadcasting an interview with a hostage who 
called for an end to the war in Chechnya106. Putin claimed he was denying hostage 
access to the media:  
                                                 
105 For more, see Gregory Feifer, “Russia: Hostage Crisis Reveals Desperation over Chechen Conflict,” 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Online, 24 October 2002.  
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The main weapon of terrorists is not grenades and submachine guns 
and bullets, but blackmail, and the best means of such blackmail is to 
turn a terrorist act into a public show.107
The hostage-taking tragedy in the town of Beslan in North Ossetia also 
demonstrated the determination of the Putin’s administration to control information. 
From the beginning of the crisis on September 1 until its violent end two days later, 
the Kremlin, Putin and the major media outlets in Russia conducted a campaign of 
disinformation regarding the extent of the catastrophe and its dreadful consequences. 
They understated the number of hostage. The official figure of 354 hostages was 
repeated by television channels and in the public appearances of government 
representatives.108 They kept the secret that the hostage-takers’ demand for an end to 
the Chechen war and the withdrawal of Russian troops.109 Eventually, the school 
hostage ended in the bloodbath. However, even after the catastrophe took place the 
government and the media continued to minimize the number of casualties.  
5.5 Putin’s Consolidating Legal Power on media 
Since Putin became the Russian president in 2000, press freedom has been 
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regularly and strongly challenged by his administration. In January 2000, Putin signed 
a new law transferring control of government subsidies for regional newspapers from 
local politicians to the press ministry.110 The law affected 2000 subsidized newspapers 
across Russia and acted as a further mechanism for central government control.  
In September 2000, Putin approved the Information Security Doctrine of the 
Russian Federation. The doctrine developed the National Security Concept of the 
Russian Federation as applied to the information sphere and also highlighted the four 
components of the national interests of the Russian Federation in the information 
sphere.111 One of the components is “the information support of the Russian 
Federation state policy, delivering to Russian and international publics trustworthy 
information about state policy and the official position of Russia on socially 
significant events of internal and international life.”112 The highlight implies that the 
state policy and the official position of Russia are the foremost national interests. As a 
result, the objectivity of trustworthy information is doubted. To protect national 
interests, any trustworthy information includes more than the literal meaning. It refers 
to the information that is not contradicted with the official statement of government 
and the information that can also help the government to intensify its authority.  
The government also continued to invent new rules to muzzle journalists such 
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as the anti-terrorist bill approved by parliament on December 17, 2004. It allowed 
Putin to impose Chechnya-style emergency measures anywhere in the country.113 On 
the pretext of anti-terrorist operations, the government is able to ban journalists from 
reporting on events or even mentioning them.  
One of Putin’s successes is having quietly and steadily gained control of the 
entire media since he came to power in 2000. After the fights with anti-Putin oligarchs, 
the main conflicts, faced by Russian current media, lie between the media 
nationalization and the media professionalization. The “nationalization” is known as 
public ownership or the act of taking private assets into government or state 
ownership. Media nationalization insists on the unparalleled leading role of 
government in media reform. This idea was exactly what Putin promoted in his media 
policy. By contrast, the media professionalization emphasizes on the 
self-independence and media freedom. Professionalization makes the media more 
independent and improves standards in collecting, editing, reporting and 
disseminating objective and balanced information. So the conflict between the media 
nationalization and the media professionalization is apparent and also cannot be 
reconciled. Therefore, whether to choose the nationalization or the professionalization 
is just a dilemma that Putin’s administration has to face. In looking at Putin’s media 
policies, he has made a pro-nationalization shift. In one aspect, he supported the super 
state-control gas and oil companies to take over the previous oligarchs’ media groups 
to achieve the goal of media nationalization. However, after pro-oligarchs such as 
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Gazprom and Lukoil controlled NTV and ORT, Putin didn’t encourage them to 
appoint their own confidants to operate the companies. On the contrary, the previous 
journalists of these bankruptcy media companies were re-employed to conduct the 
normal operation. This group of journalists and editors are the representatives of the 
Russian media professionals. As a result, the conflict between the media 
nationalization and professionalization is reflected in the delicate relations between 
the pro-Putin oligarchs and the media professionals. The action of re-employment 
implied that Putin attempted to accomplish the goal to establish his own empire under 
the camouflage of media professionalization. 
Nevertheless, no matter which path Putin chose, Russia has been undergoing 
the serve winter without media freedom. Putin extended control over the media both 
through legal seizure of several powerful media moguls and through passage of laws 
that restricted critical coverage, particularly of the war in Chechnya.  As a result, 
Freedom House’s press freedom rating114 for Russia dropped to 148 in 2005, a 
ranking that put it deeply into the category of “not free” press.  Likewise, the 
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) ranked Russia as one of the 10 most 
dangerous places to be a journalist.115 For instance, in 2004, two journalists were 
                                                 
114 According to this annual survey, the examination of the level of press freedom in each country 
currently comprises 23 methodology questions divided into three broad categories: the legal environment, the 
political environment, and the economic environment. For each methodology question, a lower number of points is 
allotted for a more free situation, while a higher number of points is allotted for a less free environment. A 
country’s final score is based on the total of the three categories: a score of 0 to 30 places the country in the free 
press group; 31 to 60 in the Partly Free press group; and 61 to 100 in the Not Free press group. 
 
115 Robert Coalson BBC News Online business reporter, “We have definitely Moved Backwards: An 
Overview of Media in Russia” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Online, June 18, 2004 
<http://www.rferl.org/reports/mm/2004/06/11-180604.asp> 
 
 79
killed; two were kidnapped; eighteen were arrested, seventeen were threatened and 
physically attacked, and three were deported.116 In 2005, two journalists were killed 
and one was kidnapped. 
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 CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Media freedom is essential to the health of democracy because open access to 
information serves as “checking function” by ensuring that elected representatives 
uphold their oaths of office and carry out the wishes of those who elected them. 
Sometimes an antagonistic relationship between media and the government represents 
a vital and healthy element of fully functioning democracies. Given this, the goal of 
media transitions should be to move the media from those that are directed or even 
overtly controlled by government or private interests to those that are more open and 
have a degree of editorial independence that serves the public interest. The public 
interest is reflected by representing a plurality of voices not only among the different 
media outlets, but also within one outlet. However, the Russian media transition is 
another story.  
In the post-communist transitional years, although the discourse on media 
reform focused on the necessity of importing the Western democratic concept of free 
media, the inadequate political and economic development established huge obstacles 
in the way of media transition. On the one hand, under the super presidency created 
by Boris Yeltsin and developed by Vladimir Putin, Russia failed to truly liberalize the 
media market and free the press from the constraints it experienced in the communism 
era. On the other, the failure in changing the economy from one that was 
plan-oriented to one that was market-oriented, as well as the worldwide economic 
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crisis, to a large extent, destroyed the financial viability of the Russian media. 
Therefore, in Russia, the goal to create a media sector supportive of democracy was 
difficult to achieve. After almost twenty-year transition from Gorbachev’s glasnost to 
the present, the Russian media had only been reformulated from the propaganda 
machine of communist government to an authoritarian product which was influenced 
both by Western ideology and leftovers of communist ideology. Many facts presented 
in previous chapters simply prove that the Russian media reform is a failure of 
democracy. 
According to William Hachten and James Scotton, the different perceptions 
about the nature and role of journalism and mass communication are rooted in 
divergent political systems and historical traditions and are broadly reflected in five 
political concepts of the media found in the world today: (1)Authoritarian, (2)Western, 
(3)Communist, (4)Revolutionary, (5)Developmental.117 Based on this classification, 
the Russian media can be categorized in the Authoritarian group, the basic principle of 
which is that the media is always subject to direct or implied control by the state or 
sovereign.  
In Yeltsin’s first tenure, the authoritarianism was not as marked as it was in the 
later years. In the early 1990s the Russian media even experienced a short golden age 
in its development. It supported the process of resuscitating the state organs of 
censorship. It struggled to keep the media dependent on state subsidies and struggled 
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to force private media outlets into the hands of the state. Nevertheless, influenced by 
the different interest groups, the voice of the Russian media was weak and low. Faced 
with the economic difficulties and the strong willingness of Yeltsin to personally 
control media resources, the Russian media compromised ultimately.  
In Yeltsin’s second tenure, the hope of freeing media from various powers was 
smashed by the collusion of oligarchs and the President. From then on the Russian 
media seemed to be back to the communist ashes. It not only became the oligarchs’ 
passport to power, but also became the President’s candies to please the oligarchs and 
the powerful weapons to achieve his own political ambitions. Russian media 
practitioners no longer assumed their responsibility to the public. They could not be 
referred to journalists, editors, or commentators any more. To some extent, they were 
businessmen. They sold their opinions, their views and even their dignity to the 
President and oligarchs for survival. 
In Putin’s Russia, the media situation has been completely disappointing and 
suffering. Soon after he was appointed as an acting prime minister in 1999, Putin 
started with establishing his own empire. To some degree, Putin has been a lucky 
person. He emerged when Russia was stuck in a financial deadlock and secessionist 
conflicts. An old Chinese idiom goes, “a hero is nothing but the product of his time.” 
Ironically speaking, Putin might be seemed as a “hero” who has risen from the chaos 
of Russia. His success in reconstructing the nation economy and improving the 
economic situation prompted him and his administration to win much more popularity 
support. With the aim to boost the Russian image in the world, Putin acquired 
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incredibly high political power. He turned this power against both the journalists and 
the oligarchs who controlled most media resources in the country. Sensitive political 
issues such as the Chechnya War became the information strategies of the President. 
In addition, journalists and editors working in the media outlets which were against 
the government were faced with the threat of being arrested or even killed.  
In March 2004 Putin dominantly won in the presidential reelection, which 
proved that Putin’s media strategy in his first tenure gained the apparent success. He 
not only had a fixed population who strongly support him, but also continued to win 
popularity in a broader sphere. Accordingly, in Putin’s second tenure, it is unlikely for 
him to change the media policies. However, with democracy developing as the 
economic situation is recovering and improving, one thing is certain: the Russian 
people will be no longer satisfied with the government’s authoritarianism over the 
media in the long run. Therefore, the last two years of his second tenure will be a big 
challenge for him. Compared with the iron-hand policies towards media, Putin will 
become mild in dealing with the media issues and even make a compromise with the 
public. His reaction to the Moscow theater crisis was probably a sign. On November 
25, 2002, Putin vetoed amendments to the press and anti-terrorism laws that had been 
under consideration for nearly a year and would have imposed new restrictions on the 
media. The State Duma passed the amendments in a second reading the morning of 
Oct. 23, just hours before Chechen rebels took control of the theater.118 Although 
journalists had doubts about what new legal restriction for reporting on crises would 
                                                 
118 “Attacks on the Press in 2002: Russia,” CPJ Press Freedom Online, 2002< 
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follow, the media generally welcomed the veto.  
Overall, the future of a prosperous Russia requires a free and independent 
media. When public opinion and public policies are shaped by news reports delivered 
by editors, reporters and publishers who assume their responsibility to society as the 
“Fourth Estate,” who answer to a calling rather than personal enrichment, who are 
completely independent from any powers, true democracy will be realized in the new 
Russia. Therefore, for the Russian media professionals, there is still a long way to go. 
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